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There is a wide consensus that, in the presence of diminishing returns to
factor accumulation, economic growth can only be sustained by innovation
and technological progress. Given this fact, this work examines the relation-
ship between innovation and economic performance through two different
perspectives. The first one is the effects of social capital on innovation and
firm performance, while the second one is the interaction between innovation,
social protection policies, and barriers to technology adoption.
Following an introductory chapter, the second chapter begins from the
assertion that social capital, in particular levels of interpersonal trust, is as-
sociated with higher levels of economic performance. Recent evidence shows
that this effect is causal, but the mechanism through which this occurs is
still unclear. The chapter then gauges the effect of trust on economic per-
formance through market size, and research and development. It builds a
model of endogenous growth that, in equilibrium, generates a positive asso-
ciation between interpersonal trust, labor supplied in the market, and the
number of patent applications; and a negative association between interper-
sonal trust and the share of the labor force comprised of non-scientists and
engineers. Then, it tests these results by exploiting the exogenous variation
in culture caused by differences in past literacy rates and institutions within
European countries. Social capital is found to have a positive and sizable
causal effect on innovation output (patent applications), number of active
firms, and persons employed; and a negative effect on the percentage of the
labor force not comprised of scientists nor engineers. Given the theory pre-
sented, this is interpreted as evidence in favor interpersonal trust affecting
economic outcomes through market sizes and R&D.
Then, a third chapter explores the relationship between social protection
policies and innovation. If economic growth is caused by innovation, and so-
cial protection policies discourage entrepreneurship, how can some countries
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grow fast while maintaining a large social safety net? This chapter explorers
theoretically and empirically the relationship between social protection poli-
cies, barriers to technology adoption, and total factor productivity (TFP)
growth. It first introduces barriers to technology adoption and a moral haz-
ard problem regarding entrepreneurs’ efforts into a model of endogenous tech-
nological change. As a result, countries must choose only two out of three
objectives: high economic growth rates, social protection, or protection from
foreign competition through barriers to technology adoption. In addition,
each type of policy has a differential effect on different components of TFP
growth. I use a panel of countries to test whether these differential effects
are supported by data. Generally, they are: social protection polices have a
stronger effect on TFP growth net of knowledge spillovers, and barriers to
technology adoption have a larger effect on overall TFP growth.
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Modern economic growth theory stems from the seminal contribution of
Solow (1956). It starts with a simple argument. If the aggregate production
function for an economy exhibits constant returns to scale and diminishing
marginal returns to capital and labor, sustained economic growth is only
possible if there exists technological progress. In a later contribution, Uzawa
(1961) shows that technological progress must be labor-augmenting in order
for sustained growth to occur.
More generally, the result from Solow (1956) implies that sustained eco-
nomic growth requires the existence of a factor, or factors, of production
with increasing returns to scale: as Rebelo (1991) makes clear, for perpetual
growth to exist there must be a factor or a combination of factors that can be
accumulated indefinitely without diminishing returns. One notable example
is the model in Lucas (1988), in which “knowledge”, or human capital serves
as this factor.
However, economic theory struggled for a long time to truly incorporate
technological progress into growth models. For instance, the models both
in Solow (1956) and in Lucas (1988) simply assume the existence a factor
that accumulates indefinitely without diminishing returns. Beginning with
the literature on endogenous growth models, started by Romer (1990), the
development of new technologies and the creation of new ideas have been
explicitly added to economic models. The key insight that allowed for this
breakthrough is the realisation that ideas have properties of public goods. In
particular, their use is non-rival, which allows for increasing returns.
In any case, the main message from all these advancements in the theory of
economic growth remains somewhat the same. Long-run, sustained increases
in GDP per capita are the results of higher levels of productivity, caused by
improvements in technology and innovation. This idea is supported empir-
ically. As Hall and Jones (1999) show, differences in physical capital and
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educational attainment explain only part of the dispersion in output per
worker, which implies that the Solow residual must explain the majority of
these differences.
In this work, then, I explore the role of innovation and technological
progress on economic growth through two different perspectives. First, in
Chapter 2, I examine the role of social capital in innovation and economic
performance. A growing literature shows that social capital, that is, the set
of common cultural values shared by individuals in a society, has effects on
economic performance. While some studies have established that these ef-
fects are causal, knowledge on the mechanism that relates social capital to
economic performance is yet to be developed. Given the results in economic
growth theory described above, I explore how social capital, and interper-
sonal trust in particular, affects innovation and firm performance. Both from
a theoretical an empirical perspective, I find that higher levels of interper-
sonal trust are associated with more innovation.
On the other hand, if innovation is so important, how can some countries
enact policies that curtail it while still maintaining high levels of economic
performance? This is the topic of Chapter 3. In this chapter, I study how
can some countries sustain high rates of total factor productivity (TFP)
growth while keeping extensive social protection policies. This turns out
to be possible due to the non-rivalry of ideas. While large social protec-
tion nets do indeed curb innovation efforts, the existence of international
knowledge spillovers allow economies to grow in the presence of high levels of
social protection. However, in practice, barriers to technology adoption are
big enough to explain the sizable differences observed in income per capita
across countries. Therefore, I take into account these barriers in my analysis.
As a result, the interaction between social protection policies and barriers to
technology adoption imply that TFP growth will come from different com-
ponents depending on policies that a country enacts. This result is found to
be supported by data.
2
CHAPTER 2
SOCIAL CAPITAL, INNOVATION, AND
FIRM PERFORMANCE: THEORY AND
EVIDENCE
2.1 Introduction
Culture does affect economic performance. Since the 1990s, numerous studies
have shown that broad measures of cultural traits and social values, social
capital as economists call them, are associated with the economic outcomes
of individuals, firms, and countries. More recently, some of these effects
were shown to be more than simple correlations. Differences in culture cause
differences in economic performance, especially when measured by GDP per
capita and GDP per capita growth. Nevertheless, the exact mechanisms that
drive these differences are not clear yet. This chapter contributes to this topic
by tackling these mechanisms. In sum, it tries to answer how does culture
affect economic performance?
In particular, this chapter investigates the effects of social capital on eco-
nomic performance through market activities, and research and development,
first theoretically and then empirically. Since Solow (1956), technological
progress is known to be the main factor that sustains economic growth in
the long run. The literature on endogenous growth attempts to better un-
derstand this phenomenon by explicitly modeling the R&D sector, the sector
that generates technological progress. Therefore, it seems reasonable to ex-
amine whether social capital affects economic performance through its effects
in the R&D sector, if there are any.
Naturally, such an explanation does not prevent social capital from causing
differences in economic outcomes through different mechanisms, such as the
organization of firms economy-wide, and this research does indeed explore
some of these possibilities. However, determining the R&D effects of culture
is the first step in gauging how large they are relative to the effects on other
sectors. If no effects are found, this would be evidence that economists should
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look elsewhere for the effects of culture on economic outcomes.
The main finding of the chapter is that culture does have an impact on re-
search and development. For European regions, narrow measures of cultural
traits (interpersonal trust) as well as broader measures (the first principal
component of several cultural variables) have a positive and economically
sizable effect on R&D output, as measured by the number of patent ap-
plications to the European Patent Office (EPO) per million inhabitants in
the active population. On average, a one standard-deviation increase in the
share of the population that believes that most people can be trusted in-
creases patent applications by 210 per million inhabitants, which amounts to
the average number of patent applications across regions.
Moreover, cultural traits are also shown to have a positive effect on the
number of active firms, and persons employed in European regions; as well
as a negative effect on the share of the labor force comprised of neither
scientists nor engineers. These empirical results support theoretical results
that are also developed here.
This chapter incorporates social capital into an endogenous growth model.
Then, it develops an equilibrium relationship between interpersonal trust,
market activities, and production decisions. The main assumption driving
this result is a choice that the representative household has between generat-
ing consumption by itself using labor, or purchasing it in the market. Trust,
then, decreases the relative productivity of labor in this process, reflecting
the idea that in environments with high trust, agents are more willing to
engage in market activities. Then, a larger market size, through knowledge
spillovers and scale effects, increases the productivity of labor in the creation
of new ideas, shifting workers to the R&D sector, and increasing the growth
rate of the economy.
The empirics, on the other hand, are based on the work of Tabellini (2010),
that establishes a causal effect of culture on economic performance, mainly
GDP per capita in European regions. Since culture is endogenous to the
process of economic development, an exogenous source of variation in culture
is necessary. Moreover, the endogeneity of culture implies that variables that
affect economic development also affect culture. One of such variables is the
quality of early institutions, as discussed in Acemoglu et al. (2001). But the
question remains how to distinguish the effect of these early institutions on
present institutions from their effect on present culture?
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European history, provided some conditions are verified, allows me to make
such distinctions. Formal institutions have been constant in European coun-
tries for at least the past 150 years. However, there has been political varia-
tion within these countries. By controlling for country fixed effects, the effect
of early institutions on present institutions can be removed, leaving only the
effect on culture. Naturally, for this strategy to work, variation within coun-
tries is needed, and this is what motivates an analysis on the regional level.
Concretely, I use the quality of early institutions (1600 -1850) and literacy
rates in 1880 as instrumental variables for culture, and then estimate the
causal effects of culture on innovation.
The research presented here has connections with many strands of the
literature. The first one is the literature on the economic effects of social
capital. A first contribution is Putnam et al. (1994), that establishes how
the different histories of northern and southern Italy had effects on culture
and economic outcomes. This idea, however, can be traced back to the
seminal work of Banfield (1958). In economics, La Porta et al. (1997) and
Knack and Keefer (1997) started a series of empirical papers on the topic,
in particular papers that use the interpersonal trust variable in the World
Values Survey and related datasets as a measure of cultural traits. The focus
on interpersonal trust is studied in an experimental setting in Glaeser et al.
(2000). In this general topic, Guiso et al. (2006) provides an interesting
review.
More recently, however, empirical work has been done to establish whether
or not culture has a causal effect on economic outcomes. Besides Tabellini
(2010), cited above, Algan and Cahuc (2010) and Guiso et al. (2016) try
to establish such results. The first paper controls for country-fixed effects
with a first-difference estimation strategy. This strategy, however, requires
measurements of trust that are sufficiently lagged. These are obtained by
using the trust that the descendants of immigrants to the United States
inherited. In such a setting, trust is causally associated with higher GDP
per capita. Guiso et al. (2016), using exogenous variations on the history
of Italian cities, on the other hand, establish that historical shocks have
persistent effects on culture.
This chapter also connects to a literature that studies the effects of trust
on firm organization. Bloom et al. (2012), using data on interviews with
managers, show that in high trusting environments, firms are more likely
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to decentralize production and achieve larger sizes, echoing the effects of
trust on the size of organizations studied by La Porta et al. (1997). Finally,
Cingano and Pinotti (2016) show how trust affects the organization of firms
and how it has consequences for the pattern of comparative advantages.
Another field related to the research presented here is the microeconomics
of cultural transmission and its consequences. Bisin and Verdier (2001) pro-
vide a survey on the theoretical and empirical literature on transmission,
whereas Bisin and Verdier (1998) present a first model on the transmission
of culture and preferences. Bénabou and Tirole (2006) study how beliefs
evolve over time in a manner similar to cultural traits. Regarding the in-
terplay between trust and institutions, Aghion et al. (2010) study how trust
and regulation are connected, while Carlin et al. (2009) argue that trust and
regulation are substitutes in financial markets.
Finally, this chapter contributes to the literature on endogenous growth
theory. On the theoretical side, it expands the work of Romer (1990) and
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). It also contributes to the debate on scale
effects and endogenous growth, as in Jones (1995) and Jones (1999).
Following this introduction, the next section presents theoretical results
that include social capital in an economic growth framework, generating four
different predictions. The following section, tests these predictions empir-
ically. Finally, a conclusion summarizes the main results, discussing their
shortcomings, and presenting perspectives for new research.
2.2 Theory
To analyze the effects of social capital on the research and development
sector and economic performance, I present a theory of economic growth in
which the level of social capital has consequences for the rate of technological
progress and, thus, output and consumption growth. The model consists of
a standard endogenous growth model with two main modifications.
Like many endogenous growth models, production of a final good occurs
through the employment of labor and a number of intermediate goods that
are produced by monopolists with perpetual patents. In addition, labor
can be used to develop new varieties of intermediate goods. Growth occurs
through spillovers in the creation of new varieties: as the stock of knowledge
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increases, the marginal productivity of a worker in research and development
increases as well.
The first modification is that the representative household must decide how
much consumption to obtain through the market and how much consumption
to produce by itself, using its labor endowment and the economy’s stock of
knowledge. This implies a richer type of labor supply decision, since the
household has more options to allocate its labor.
The second modification concerns the effects of social capital in the econ-
omy. Concretely, I focus on interpersonal trust. This is due to the fact that in
the empirical literature this is the cultural variable that exhibits the largest
effects on economic performance. Nevertheless, one can interpret the results
below as a consequence of other cultural dimensions.
In particular, trust decreases the marginal productivity of labor when em-
ployed in the production of consumption inside the household. This causes
the representative household to supply more labor in the market, which in
turns increases the growth rate of this economy. It also causes the fraction
of the labor force allocated in the production of the final good to decrease.
First, I describe the model economy and solve for its equilibrium. Then, I
establish the existence of a balanced growth path (BGP). After that, I show
the effects of higher levels of social capital in this balanced growth path and
finish by discussing the modeling assumption and its consequences, in order
to shed light on how trust promotes economic growth in this model.
2.2.1 The Model Economy
Consider an economy in continuous, infinite time, denoted by t. It is popu-
lated by a representative household endowed with a time-invariant amount of
L to supply and it produces a final good, Y (t). The production of this final
good occurs through the employment of labor and a continuum of size N(t)
of intermediate goods, with each variety of the intermediate good denoted
by ν. Growth happens through the increase in the number of varieties N(t).
Thus, N(t) can be interpreted both as the number of varieties of intermediate
goods and as the economy’s stock of knowledge.












where x(ν, t) denotes the amount of intermediate good ν employed, and LF (t)
denotes the amount of labor employed, both at time t. The term 1/(1− β)
serves as a normalization, for later notational simplicity. To simplify the
analysis, assume that x(ν, t) depreciates fully after use. Finally, assume that
the production of this final good happens in a perfectly competitive market.
As common in endogenous growth theory, the production and creation
of new intermediate goods is important. Assume that an entrepreneur in
this market, in order to produce a variety ν of the intermediate good, must
first obtain a blueprint for its production. Once this blueprint is obtained,
this entrepreneur has a perpetual patent on the production of intermediate
good ν, which allows it to sell that variety at a monopoly price px(ν, t) that
maximizes its profits. In addition, suppose that, given the blueprint, the
intermediate good is produced at a constant marginal cost ψ.
The creation of new blueprints takes the form
Ṅ(t) = ηN(t)LR(t), (2.2)
where η > 0 is a parameter governing the productivity of this process, and
LR(t) denotes the amount of labor employed in the research and development
of new ideas at time t.
The first feature of note in equation (2.2) is the presence of N(t). It
implies that creation of new blueprints, that is, the increase in the stock
of knowledge, increases as the stock of knowledge becomes larger, a feature
first introduced in Romer (1990). Together with equation (2.1) this means
that new ideas have two positive effects, one in the production of the final
good itself, via equation (2.1), and one through the creation of new ideas,
via 2.2. Moreover, even though only the entrepreneur with the patent to
variety ν can produce it, it cannot prevent other entrepreneurs from using
the knowledge obtained in the creation of ν to create new varieties. These
knowledge spillovers provide the increasing returns that allow the economy
to grow unboundedly.
In addition, equation (2.2) also makes clear that employing more labor in
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the production of new blueprints leads to a higher rate of production of new
varieties. Once again, the inclusion of N(t) is important here: it implies that
the productivity of labor in the research and development sector increases as
the stock of knowledge grows.
On the consumption side of this economy, assume that this economy ad-







where ρ denotes continuous time-discount factor, and σ denotes the risk aver-
sion coefficient. This household, therefore, derives utility at every period t
from consumption, denoted by C(t). This amount consumed, however, is not
simply obtained in the market. Suppose that the representative household
can generate consumption by either spending the final good or by using its
labor endowment and the stock of ideas. In particular, let consumption be
given by
C(t) = XC(t) + (1− θ)N(t)LC(t)α, (2.4)
where α ∈ (0, 1); XC(t) denotes the amount of the final good devoted to
consumption, and LC(t) denotes the amount of labor employed in consump-
tion. Moreover, let θ be level of trust in this economy, so that (1− θ) can be
interpreted as distrust.
The specification above incorporates the main assumption about the role
that trust plays in this economy. The representative household has two ways
in which to produce the consumption stream from which it derives utility.
The first one is simply through market activities, namely, purchasing con-
sumption in the market, which is denoted by XC . In addition, the household
can generate consumption by spending its labor supply. In this case, it faces
diminishing marginal returns on labor, but is uses the entire knowledge stock
of the economy N(t). This assumption is necessary to generate a balanced
growth path, but it is also justified by the notion that knowledge in this
economy is non-rival. The role of trust (or distrust), then, is to make home-
production of consumption less (more) appealing than market activities.
While not explicitly modeled here, this effect of trust on the decision to
participate in markets is natural and can be obtained as a result of different
contexts. For example, suppose that within an instant of time, the household
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must first supplyXC(t) to place an order in the market to obtain consumption
later, which constitutes a potential hold-up problem. In this case, the level
of distrust 1 − θ can be interpreted as the probability of the household not
receiving consumption from the supplier. It is then natural that the higher
the distrust, the greater the amount of consumption generated inside the
household will be.
The next subsection describes producers and household choices in order to
define an equilibrium in this economy.
2.2.2 Equilibrium
Consider first the final goods producer problem. It chooses the amount of



















where, due to the fact that this market is perfectly competitive, the producer
takes prices px(ν, t) as given. Then, the first order condition for this problem










and the first order condition with respect to intermediate good type ν yields
the demand for this type of intermediate good, given by
x(ν, t) = px(ν, t)−1/βLF (t), (2.7)
which is intuitive, given that the elasticity of the demand for variety ν is
constant at εβ ≡ 1/β.
Next, consider the choices of an intermediate good producer, say of variety
ν. Given that the intermediate good is produced at a constant marginal cost
ψ and that once with possession of a patent, the producer acts as a monop-
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olist, the decision is to choose the price charged in order to maximize flow




π(ν, t) ≡ px(ν, t)x(ν, t)− ψx(ν, t)
s.t. x(ν, t) = px(ν, t)−1/βLF (t).
(2.8)
Therefore, the net present discounted value of the blueprint for variety ν is
obtained by discounting the stream of flow profits:







The solution to the intermediate good producer problem detailed above





which, given the isoelastic demand, involves a markup 1/(1 − β) over the
marginal cost. Moreover, symmetry across intermediate producers implies
that all varieties ν ∈ [0, N(t)] charge the same price, which is also constant
over time.
Plugging the price in equation (2.10) into the demand for variety ν gives























Substituting the equilibrium amount of varieties in equation (2.11) into
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the final good production function (2.1) yields a derived production function









which makes clear how economic growth occurs in this economy. Notice
that final good output is given by the total amount of varieties and the
amount of labor employed in final good production. Given that the total
labor supply is fixed at L, the only sustained option for growth in this model
economy occurs through the unbounded expansion in the stock of knowledge
N(t). In addition, given that firms take N(t) as given, from the viewpoint of
producers, final good production is subject to constant returns to scale. To
















is an aggregator for the intermediate goods. However, equation (2.14) makes
clear that the increase in the number of varieties causes output to grow, and,
given the fixed labor supply, also causes income per capita to grow.
From equation (2.6), the total demand for labor gives the equilibrium wage









The last component on the production side of this economy is the research
and development sector. There, under the assumption that new ideas are
being created, free entry of new firms will cause the net present discounted
value of a blueprint to be zero. Therefore, since the only choice for an
entrepreneur is the amount of labor to employ in research and development,
this free entry condition implies that the marginal product of one unit of labor
in terms of new knowledge generated equals its marginal cost, the wage rate.
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Thus:
ηN(t)V (ν, t) = w(t). (2.18)
On the household side of this economy, the representative agent has two
choices: consumption and labor supply. Starting with the latter, the rep-
resentative household must decide how much labor to supply either to the
final-good sector, the research and development sector, or to its own produc-
tion of consumption. It therefore faces the following restriction:
LF (t) + LR(t) + LC(t) 6 L. (2.19)
The consumption choice, on the other hand, is a choice between how much
consumption to obtain from the market and how much consumption to gen-
erate at home. The amount of consumption purchased at the market is
obviously constrained by the representative household’s budget, so XC(t)
must satisfy









where the right-hand side makes clear that the household derives income
from labor, the flow profits from entrepreneurs, and interest generated from
financial wealth. Recalling that consumption C(t) is generated according to
equation (2.4), the constraint above becomes:























LF (t) + LR(t) + LC(t) 6 L.
(2.22)
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The second one is the choice of labor to be employed in consumption. From
the maximization problem, this is given by
w(t) = α(1− θ)LC(t)α, (2.24)












Finally, the transversality condition for this problem requires the total












The presence of intermediate goods monopolists prevent calling the equi-
librium in this model a competitive equilibrium. In this context, then, a
decentralized equilibrium for this economy can be defined as follows:
definition
Definition 2.1 A decentralized equilibrium for this economy consists of
time paths of consumption [C(t)]∞t=0, labor choices [LF (t)+LR(t)+LC(t)]
∞
t=0,
final goods used in consumption and intermediate-good production [XC(t), XI(t)]
∞
t=0,
number of varieties [N(t)]∞t=0, time paths of prices and quantities of each
variety [px(ν, t), x(ν, t)]∞t=0,ν∈N(t), and time paths of interest rate and wages
[r(t), w(t)]∞t=0 such that:
i. Given time paths for interest rates and wages [r(t), w(t)]∞t=0, [C(t), LF (t),
LR(t), LC(t)]
∞
t=0 solve the representative household problem.
ii. Given time paths for wages, [w(t)]∞t=0, and prices for intermediate goods,
[px(ν, t), ]∞t=0,ν∈N(t), [LF (t), x(ν, t)]
∞
t=0,ν∈N(t) solve the final goods producer
problem.
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iii. Each monopolist ν chooses prices [px(ν, t)]∞t=0 to maximize profits.
iv. There is free entry in the research and development market.
v. Markets clear.
2.2.3 Balanced Growth
Consider then a balanced growth path (BGP) defined as an equilibrium in
which consumption and output grow at identical, constant rates, and in
which labor allocations are constant over time. This subsection establishes
that such a balanced growth path exists.
Let g∗C denote the growth rate of consumption, and, more generally, let
asterisks denote BGP values. Notice first that from equation (2.25), labor
used in the creation of consumption is constant over time. Denote, then, this
value by L∗C . The time-constant, residual amount of labor to be allocated into
research and development and final good production, denoted, respectively
by L∗R and L
∗
F , is then L− L∗C ≡ NL∗.
Then, notice that from equation (2.14), if such a BGP exists, it requires
output to grow at the same rate as the number of varieties N(t). Moreover,
from the Euler equation, if consumption grows at a constant rate, the interest
rate must also be constant. Thus, let
r(t) = r∗ ∀t.
Moreover, from equation (2.12), the value of intermediate good ν becomes




and since free entry implies ηN(t)V (ν, t) = w(t), equilibrium wages in equa-

























From the discussion above, output grows at the same rate as N(t). There-












≡ g∗C ∀t. (2.29)
Finally, to pin down the labor allocation, notice from equation (2.2) that








η(1− β)ψ−1 + ησ
, (2.30)
which finishes the characterization of the BGP.
Therefore, the following result holds.
proposition
Proposition 2.1 Suppose that
(1− σ)(1− β)ψ−1ηL∗F < ρ < (1− β)ψ−1ηL∗F . (2.31)
Then, starting from any initial stock of knowledge N(0) > 0, there exists a
unique equilibrium balanced growth path. In this equilibrium, consumption,










Proof: The preceding discussion establishes that if the BGP exists, that
it is unique, and that its growth rate is given by equation (2.32). It re-
mains to show that this rate is positive and that this equilibrium satisfies the
transversality condition in equation (2.26). From equation (2.32), it is clear
that (1−β)ψ−1ηL∗F > ρ implies that g∗C is positive. Finally, in the BGP, the










where, given that in the BGP the interest rate is constant, V (ν, t) = π(ν, t)/r∗.
Therefore, it is clear that in order for this condition to hold, the interest rate
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must be positive and greater than the growth rate of N(t). Thus,
(1− β)ψ−1ηL∗F > (1/σ)[(1− β)ψ−1 − ρ] =⇒ ρ > (1− σ)(1− β)ψ−1ηL∗F ,
which also guarantees that utility is finite, since it implies (1− σ)g∗C > ρ. 
2.2.4 The Effects of Trust
Having established the equilibrium and the balanced growth path in this
economy, this subsection explores the effects of better social capital, namely
higher levels of interpersonal trust on the BGP equilibrium.
First, notice that an increase in interpersonal trust, given by higher θ, de-
creases the amount of labor used by the household to generate consumption.
proposition
Proposition 2.2 A higher level of interpersonal trust decreases the amount
































which is negative, given that α < 1. 
The result in Proposition 2.2 is intuitive. As equation (2.4) makes clear,
higher levels of trust decrease the marginal productivity of labor when em-
ployed to generate consumption inside the household. Thus, it is natural
that trust will decrease the amount of labor employed in this activity. More-
over, due to the fact that the amount of labor that the household uses to
generate consumption decreases, the following proposition establishes as a
corollary that the amount of labor left to allocate between the production of
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final goods, and research and development, in the BGP, NL∗, increases with
trust.
proposition
Proposition 2.3 A higher level of interpersonal trust increases the amount





Proof: Follows immediately from the fact that NL∗ ≡ L− L∗C . 
The effects of trust on the amounts of labor used in final good production,
and research and development are not obvious. While it does allow for more
labor employed on both productions, it is not clear whether the labor allo-
cation between final good production and research and development remains
constant in terms of shares, that is, it is not clear whether both allocations
increase in the same proportion. As the following propositions establish, the
amount of labor employed by both sectors will increase, while the share of
labor used in final good production decreases.
proposition
Proposition 2.4 In a balanced growth path, a higher level of interpersonal














which must be positive, given that ∂NL∗/∂θ > 0. 
At the same time, though, the amount of labor employed in research and
development also increases.
proposition
Proposition 2.5 In a balanced growth path, a higher level of interpersonal






Proof: Since NL∗ = L∗F + L
∗
R, equation (2.30) implies
L∗R =
η(1− β)ψ−1NL∗ − ρ











which must be positive, given that ∂NL∗/∂θ > 0. 
However, it is not true that both L∗F and L
∗
R increase at the same propor-
tion. In fact, the share of labor devoted to final good production decreases.
As a consequence, it is natural that the share of labor employed in research
and development increases.
proposition
Proposition 2.6 In a balanced growth path, a higher level of interpersonal










η(1− β)ψ−1 + ησ
+
ρ














which must be negative, given that ∂NL∗/∂θ > 0. 
One final result must be established. In particular, it is necessary to obtain
the effects of interpersonal trust on the growth rate of the stock of knowledge.
proposition
Proposition 2.7 In a balanced growth path, a higher level of interpersonal
















and Proposition 2.4. Then, a greater number of varieties is a simple conse-
quence of an increased g∗C . 
It is now useful to provide some economic intuition to the results above.
The first point to be made is that trust induces the representative household
to obtain more consumption from market activities. Therefore, the amount
of labor employed in consumption inside the household decreases, which in
turn frees labor to be used in the production of the final goods and new
ideas. Since there is more labor in the research and development sector, the
economy grows faster.
But how to explain the decrease in the labor share in the final goods sector?
The key insight here is the spillover that occurs in the creation of new ideas.
While an increase in N(t) increases the productivity of labor both in terms
of final goods and in terms of the creation of new ideas, labor is subject to
diminishing marginal productivity in the final goods sector, while not so in
the research sector. Therefore, as trust increases, less labor is used inside the
household. This causes the growth rate of the number of varieties to increase
in a BGP, which in turn increases the marginal productivity of labor in the
research and development sector relative to the final goods sector. As a result,
even though the amount of labor employed in each of the sectors increases,
the increase in the research and development sector is proportionally larger.
2.2.5 Model Discussion
Before proceeding to the empirics of this problem, it is useful to discuss some
aspects of this model economy.
A good starting point is the choice the representative household has be-
tween producing consumption by itself or obtaining it through market ac-
tivities, since this decision is how interpersonal trust affects this economy.
The model assumed that the household can generate consumption by itself
through the use of labor and the stock of knowledge in the economy. In more
detail, it is assumed that while labor exhibits diminishing marginal returns
in this process, the stock of knowledge has a linear effect on this process.
The introduction of N(t) is natural, since it seems far fetched to assume
that the representative household does not use all the knowledge available to
turn labor into consumption. Moreover, one of the main messages of these
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types of endogenous growth models is that ideas are non-rival, that is, once
a method of production is invented, all agents benefit from it.
The linearity of N(t) in the household generation of consumption, however,
is not as straightforward. In fact, its assumption serves basically to guar-
antee the existence of a balanced growth path. Suppose otherwise, that the
stock of knowledge exhibits diminishing marginal returns in the generation
of consumption inside the household, say C(t) = XC(t)+(1−θ)N(t)γLC(t)α,
for γ ∈ (0, 1). Then, the amount of labor that the household dedicates to














and in any equilibrium with positive growth it decreases towards zero. Then,
trust has no effect on the BGP.
If, however, N(t) exhibits the same diminishing returns in the production
of the final good, a balanced growth path still exists. The main takeaway
here, thus, is that a balanced growth path requires the effect of new ideas
to be the same in the final goods sector and the production of consumption
inside the household.
Second, it is important to point out the presence of scale effects in this
economy. According to equation (2.32), a larger population, via a larger
NL(t), increases the rate of growth of this economy. As discussed below,
this assumption is crucial for interpersonal trust to promote growth. Before
that, however, it is important to acknowledge that this assumption is not
without issues. For example, Jones (1995) provides evidence contraty to this
assumption.
It is possible to have a balanced growth path without these scale effects.
On possibility is to follow Jones (1999). In this context, new ideas are created
according to Ṅ(t) = ηN(t)ϕLR(t), and there is population growth at the rate
of n. Solving the model under these assumptions yields a BGP growth rate
of g∗C = σ(1 − ϕ)−1 + ρ, which is independent of the level of interpersonal
trust. Therefore, in an economy as the one described above, trust promotes
growth by intensifying scale effects.
In fact, it is precisely through the interaction of culture and scale effects
that interpersonal trust promotes growth in this model economy. The main
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impact of trust in this context is to increase the population engaged in mar-
ket activities. Once this happens, the movement to a BGP with a higher
rate of growth occurs through the presence of scale effects. This relates the
results here to research that focus on the importance of market size for eco-
nomic growth. Tangentially, this also relates the results here to research in
international trade that model freer trade as domestic firms gaining access to
larger markets. Larger markets may not require trade agreements, but only
better social capital.
The presence of scale effects is, thus, of crucial importance here. Whether
it is warranted or not is a more complicated issue, and not one to be solved
only through theory. In order to shed light on this issue, the next section
shows that the main predictions of the model are not rejected by data.
2.3 Evidence
The model above established several results regarding the effects of trust
in an economy. In particular, it shows that higher levels of trust will (i)
increase the rate of growth of knowledge, or concretely, lead to a higher
number of patent applications; (ii) decrease the share of labor employed in
the final goods sector, or alternatively, decrease the share of non-scientists
and engineers in the labor force; and (iii) increase economic performance in
the final goods sector, which can be understood as a larger number of firms
with more employees. The result relating trust and economic performance as
measured by GDP per capita has already been considered by the literature
on the topic, and, therefore, is not of primary interest here.
The objective of this empirical analysis, then, is to test whether the theo-
retical results described above are supported by data. In other words, testing
whether greater levels of trust lead to a higher output of patents, a decrease
in the non-scientist and engineer share of the labor force, and more numer-
ous and larger firms. In other words, the goal is to explore the mechanism
behind the positive, and likely causal, relationship between social capital
and economic performance. Of course, establishing that trust increases the
production of knowledge does not imply that trust is the only mechanism
through which culture can affect economies. However, the lack of such a
result does imply that economists should look somewhere else. This test,
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therefore, is a worthy one.
The key issue in estimating a causal effect of culture on economic develop-
ment and related variables is that culture is endogenous to the development
phenomenon. Economic development is a process that has effects on cul-
tural and social traits, and these traits generate a bias on estimates of the
effect of culture. Therefore, in order to identify a causal effect from culture
to innovation and R&D behavior, exogenous variations in culture must be
exploited.
The idea here is to apply the methodology of Tabellini (2010). The
methodology, that follows from Acemoglu et al. (2001), uses the fact that
countries in Europe have been subject to the same formal and legal institu-
tions for the past century and a half, but within several of these countries
different political histories are observed. Therefore, controlling for country
fixed effects removes from cultural measures the effects of common national
institutions. What remains, then, is just the effect of historical variables.
Then, historical variables that serve as exogenous variation for culture and
institutional features, once country fixed-effects are added, become a source
of exogenous variation on culture only and, hence, can be exploited as instru-
mental variables. Naturally, such an approach requires the level of analysis
to be more disaggregated than the country level, so I use regions in Europe.
2.3.1 Estimation Strategy
The goal is to identify the causal effect of trust, and culture in general, on
innovation activities, measured by the number of patents generated, the share
of workers not employed as scientists and engineers, and firm performance.
Consider, then, the following regression model:
I = α + βC + δI0 + γX + ε, (2.33)
where I denotes a regional innovation of firms performance variable, C is a
measurement of culture, I0 is an indicator of past innovation or firm perfor-
mance, X denotes other regressors, ε is a unobserved error term, and β is
the parameter of interest. The model above suffers from the common endo-
geneity issue: culture and the unobserved error term in equation (2.33) are
likely to be correlated. This may be due to reverse causality, since innovation
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and development are closely linked, and development affects cultural traits.
Moreover, omitted variables may also contribute to this problem.
To tackle the issue of endogeneity, it is necessary to understand the de-
terminants of trust and culture. One possibility is to follow the theoretical
work of Bisin and Verdier (2001) , Bénabou and Tirole (2006), and Boyd and
Richerson (1985) and assume that culture is shaped by two forces: horizon-
tal and vertical transmission. Horizontal transmission is the diffusion and
evolution of cultural traits through social and economic interactions among
peers, that is, contemporaneously. Vertical transmission, on the other hand,
occurs across generations, mainly from parents to children. Evidence that
vertical transmission does indeed influence the evolution of cultural traits
is available. One example is immigrants, who carry with themselves values
close to those seen in their ancestors’ countries of origin. In fact, the second
part of the empirical analysis here exploits this fact.
Then, a plausible model of culture can be
C = a+ bC0 + dI0 + cX + u, (2.34)
where C0 denotes the cultural traits of earlier generations, and u is an error
term capturing all other determinants of culture. These earlier traits, if
observable, would be a natural instrumental variable. Unfortunately, they are
not available. However, since current cultural variables depend on, besides
earlier culture, other regressors denoted by X, earlier cultural traits will
depend on earlier regressors, denoted by X0 and so we can write
C = φ0 + φ1X0 + φ2I0 + φ3X + ν, (2.35)
where the φi are the parameters, and ν is an unobserved error term. The
variables in X0, then, are the instrumental variables in this approach. They
separate the variation in culture that is exogenous, that is, due to the his-
torical variables, from the possibly endogenous variation in culture due to
ν.
However, for this estimation strategy to yield unbiased and causal esti-
mates of β in equation (2.33), two assumptions must be true. The first one
is that culture is transmitted over time, but that it also reflects contempora-
neous conditions. This amounts to X0 being included in equation (2.35). In
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concrete terms, history must affect culture, so that past values of institutional
features explain cultural differences today. This assumption is plausible. On
one hand, children tend to share cultural traits with their parents and evi-
dence from immigrants does show that culture transmits vertically. On the
other, environmental variables may very well shape the behavior of agents
and cause changes in cultural traits. Moreover, if culture is completely inde-
pendent of contemporaneous factors, endogeneity is not an issue. As usual,
this assumption, although central, is not the problematic one, since it can be
tested, albeit indirectly.
The second assumption is that the historical variables used as instruments
in H0 are valid instruments, and, thus, excluded from equation (2.33). This
restriction is not satisfied in a general way because it requires controlling
for contemporaneous regressors denoted by X. In practice, for every past
feature that affects culture, a contemporaneous measure of the same variable
must be included in the regressions.
I now describe in detail all the variables that will be used.
2.3.2 Data
I use data on 60 regions in 8 European countries: Belgium, France, West
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
Regions are defined according to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for
Statistics (NUTS), a standard for geocoding and dividing European coun-
tries into smaller subdivisions. Most of the regions in the sample amount
to the coarsest subdivision, called NUTS1. NUTS1 regions are, generally,
regions or states, and range from 3 to 7 million inhabitants. In some cases,
however, a region is a merged set of NUTS1 areas. A table containing the
regions used is in Appendix B. Given these regions, the data span four broad
categories: innovation and R&D, culture, institutions and economics, and
the instruments.
The source for R&D data is Eurostat, the main office for statistics relative
to the European Union. I use two variables. The first one is the number of
patent applications to the European Patent Office per million inhabitants in
the active population. This variable aims to be a measure of growth of the
knowledge stock, that in the theory is denoted by ˙N(t). The other variables
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Patent Applications Over European Regions
aim to capture the allocation of human capital in the R&D sector. It is
the complement of number of scientists and engineers as a percentage of
the active population. Both variables are averaged for 2005 - 2010 for each
region. For regions that are merged, the numbers of patents for each region
are added together, whereas the percentages of scientists and engineers are
averaged.
The spatial distribution of the patent applications, and the share of scien-
tists and engineers in the labor force are shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. The
variables are divided into five intervals of equal size. A point of note is that
the distribution of patent applications is more concentrated in some regions
relative to the distribution of scientists and engineers. Notice also that the
while Figure 2.2 shows the share of scientists and engineers, the analysis
focuses on the complement of this variable: the share of workers who are
neither scientists nor engineers.
Data on firm demographics is also obtained from Eurostat. In particular,
I focus on the population of active enterprises and the number of persons
employed in the population of active enterprises in each region. The ac-
tive population of enterprises is simply the number of active firms in the
region, whereas the number of persons employed includes paid and not paid
employees. These variables run from the year 2008 to 2016, and, thus, are
averaged for those years. Finally, for regions that are merged, these averages
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Scientists and Engineers (%) Over European
Regions
are added.
Data on culture is obtained from the European Values Study (EVS). The
EVS is a large-scale survey on values and beliefs related to many issues.
It covers many different European countries and consists of multiple cross-
sections. The issues are also varied: work, family, politics and society, moral-
ity and religion, etc. In particular, I use the latest wave of the EVS, collected
between 2008 and 2010. The raw data from the EVS is available at the indi-
vidual level. The mean number of observations per region is 180, but ranges
from 50 to 700. To reduce problems associated with this issue, many regres-
sions are weighted by the inverse of a measure of cultural variability in each
region. In total, I use the observations from 12,564 individuals.
The main cultural variable is interpersonal trust. For each region, I com-
pute the share of individuals who believe that most people can be trusted,
that is, who responded “Most people can be trusted” to the question “Gen-
erally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
can’t be too careful in dealing with people.” The other options are “Can’t
be too careful” and “Don’t know.”
Besides trust, I also use variables that summarize cultural attitudes more
generally. In particular, I consider, together with trust, the fraction of in-
dividuals who believe that tolerance and respect are good values to impart
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Table 2.1: Correlations Among Culture Variables
PC Culture PC Culture Pos. Trust Control Respect
PC Culture Pos. 0.92
Trust 0.66 0.69
Control 0.54 0.67 0.12
Respect 0.51 0.50 0.07 0.06
Obedience -0.48 -0.09 -0.09 -0.02 -0.07
Note: 12,564 observations.
Figure 2.3: Distribution of Trust Over European Regions
onto children, the fraction of individuals who believe that obedience is a
good value to impart onto children, and the average of how much people
believe they have control over the outcomes of their lives. Then, I compute
the first principal components of all four variables, and of the variables that
are expected to have a positive effect on innovation, namely trust, control
over the outcomes of your life, and the importance of tolerance and respect.
The correlation between all cultural variables and the principal components
is presented in Table 2.1. One feature that the table shows is that while
the cultural traits are not correlated with each other (last three columns),
the principal components are indeed correlated with the individual cultural
traits (first two columns), suggesting that the summary measures capture a
common cultural pattern besides the noise in individual responses.
Figure 2.3 shows how trust varies across European regions, whereas Figure
2.4 does the same for the first principal component of culture. As before,
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of the First Principal Component of Culture Over
European Regions
the data is displayed in intervals of equal size. Notice first that the two
figures show the correlation between both variables. Additionally, while some
correlation exists between the cultural variables and the innovation variables,
the picture is far from obvious. Finally, there is a great deal of variation in
culture for Europe, not only between countries, but also within them.
This variation, however, also occurs within each region. To control for
a part of the regional variation in culture, I followed Tabellini (2010) and
created a conditional measure of trust. This conditional trust variable is the
regional average of trust after controlling for several characteristics of each
individual respondent. Concretely, it is the regional dummy coefficient of
a regression of the trust variable on, besides the regional dummy variables,
marital status, gender, age group, and self-reported categorical variables for
health and education. The natural way to interpret this variable is to inter-
pret it as the regional trust average after controlling for the regressors just
mentioned. The same approach was taken for the other cultural variables and
principal components. Importantly, whenever these conditional measures are
used in regressions, I weight observations by the inverse of the standard error
of these dummy coefficients.
From equation (2.33) data on past innovation and data on other regressors
are needed, specifically to reduce the risk of invalid instruments. Data of past
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innovation is not available at the disaggregated level needed. However, given
the relationship between innovation and economic development, variables
for past values of development serve as proxies. The first variable used is
the gross enrollment rate of primary and secondary schools in the 1960s.
Education is known to be a determinant of economic development, so it
should also be correlated with innovation. Moreover, adding a measure of
education avoids using culture as a proxy for human capital. Finally, the
choice of using values for the 1960s is motivated by two facts: it minimizes the
risk of reverse causation, and it increases variability. The source is Tabellini
(2010), which collected the data from national statistics institutes.
The second variable is the fraction of the population living in cities with
more than 30,000 inhabitants circa 1850, an urbanization rate. The moti-
vation here is that urbanization is closely associated with economic perfor-
mance, so this variable serves as a good proxy for innovation as well. Once
again, the source is Tabellini (2010), obtained through Bairoch et al. (1988).
It remains to discuss the variables used as instruments. Equation (2.35)
implies that good instruments are past values of the regressors included in X.
Then, good instruments would be measures of past educational attainment
and economic performance across European regions. Tabellini (2010), uses
as past values of education literacy data for circa 1880. As Figure 2.5 shows
(with the data divided in five equal-length intervals), there is a good deal
of variability in these data. Literacy rates around 1880 are also positively
correlated with current economic outcomes and vary within countries.
Finally, the second instrumental variable attempts to capture innovation
behavior even further in the past. From Acemoglu et al. (2001), Acemoglu
et al. (2005), and Tabellini (2010), the quality of early institutions is a proper
instrument. An interesting and important feature of European history that
motivates this choice is the fact that regions that today belong to the same
countries were parts of different countries in the past. For instance, Ger-
many and Italy were only unified and became single countries in the 1870s,
whereas regions that belong to northern France today were part of Belgium
and Germany in the past. Therefore, there is variation in past institutions
within European countries today, and this variation can be exploited.
Data on early political institutions can be obtained from the POLITY IV
dataset. Following the existing literature, the variable Constraints on the
Executive is the variable used. It is designed to capture “institutionalized
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of Literacy Rates (%) Around 1880
constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives,” so that better
institutional quality amounts to areas where the holder of executive power
is either accountable to other political and social bodies or constrained by
checks and balances or the rule of law. The variable ranges from 1 to 7,
where 1 denotes unlimited authority and 7 denotes an accountable execu-
tive, constrained by checks and balances. Following Tabellini (2010) and
Acemoglu et al. (2005), five time spans are used: forty-year intervals be-
tween 1600, 1700, 1750, 1800, and 1850. From a geographic perspective, the
variable exhibits the same values for all regions in a given country whenever
the boundaries of the country are roughly the same today. There are two
exceptions: Northern Ireland, coded as having the same institutions as Ire-
land, and the Spanish regions of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, coded as
having a higher score due to the period between 1600 and 1700 when they
had their own Parliaments. Finally, the cases of Germany and Italy remain.
In these cases I use the values of Tabellini (2010), who tracked the institu-
tional quality of subregions in each of these countries. To summarize the five
periods used, I calculated the first principal component.
Figure 2.6 shows the geographic pattern of the first principal component of
past institutions. Great Britain, the Netherlands, and northern Italy exhibit
the best institutional quality. It is worthwhile to note that there is not a big
correlation between this instrument and the literacy rates in 1880, indicating
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of the First Principal Component of Early
Institutions
that the two instrumental variables capture different features of the history
of these regions.
2.3.3 Results
Table 2.2 presents the simple ordinary least squares estimates of the regres-
sion patent applications and percentage of non-scientists and engineers on
trust, or other culture variables, and controls, following the model in equa-
tion (2.33). Standard errors are estimated robustly and by using clusters on
countries, and presented in parenthesis, respectively, on the first and second
lines below the point estimates. Clustering on countries allows for arbitrary
correlations between regions within a country.
In general, the table reflects the correlations observed in the figures of
the preceding subsection. Trust is associated with higher levels of patent
applications, and since the principal components of culture contain trust,
these are also positively correlated with patent applications. Moreover, the
effect also reverses for the share of non-scientists and engineers in the active
population. The effects are also sizable: an increase in trust of 20 percentage
points, which amounts to roughly the difference in trust between Sicily and
Lombardy, in the south and north of Italy, respectively, is associated with 82
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Table 2.2: Innovation and Trust, OLS Estimates, Unconditional Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patent Applications Non-Scientists and Engineers
Schooling 1960 0.80 -0.04 1.19 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(1.04) (0.96) (0.86) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
(0.76) (0.79) (0.84) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Urbanization 1850 -2.02 -2.11 -1.69 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03
(1.26) (1.33) (1.39) (0.01)* (0.01)* (0.01)**




PC Culture 2.27 -0.02
(0.89)** (0.01)***
(0.83)** (0.01)*
PC Cult. Pos. 3.09 -0.03
(1.14)*** (0.01)***
(0.96)** (0.01)*
N 62 62 62 61 61 61
Adj. R2 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.59 0.59 0.61
In parentheses: robust standard errors (above), clustered on countries (below). Significance: * p <0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation method: OLS. Country fixed effects always included.
more patent applications per one million inhabitants in the active population,
almost 40% of the 209.95 patent average. Relative to non-scientists, the
increase in trust is associated with a decrease of 0.6 percentage points in the
share of scientists and engineers, from an average of 95.33%. Estimates are
similar for the conditional measures of trust and culture, presented in Table
2.3. Finally, an interesting feature of the tables is the lack of correlation
between innovation and schooling in the 1960s and urbanization in circa
1950.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present the simple ordinary least squares estimates of the
regression number of firms and persons employed, or other culture variables,
and controls, once again following the model in equation (2.33). In these
tables, trust, and more generally cultural variables, are not associated with
business demographics.
Of course, there is no reason to assume that culture is independent from
innovation or firm performance. In fact, as argued above, there are good
reasons to believe that the results in the two tables are plagued by endogene-
ity problems, and cannot be interpreted in a causal way. This would cast
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Table 2.3: Innovation and Trust, OLS Estimates, Conditional Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patent Applications Non-Scientists and Engineers
Schooling 1960 0.97 0.87 1.78 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
(1.69) (1.59) (1.65) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
(1.57) (1.40) (1.44) (0.01) (0.01)** (0.01)**
Urbanization 1850 -1.86 -1.57 -1.71 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(1.40) (1.39) (1.36) (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)**




PC Culture 249.74 -1.50
(84.23)*** (0.53)***
(98.03)** (0.54)**
PC Cult. Pos. 222.32 -1.61
(73.57)*** (0.58)***
(102.63)* (0.63)**
N 62 62 62 61 61 61
Adj. R2 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.64 0.65 0.65
In parentheses: robust standard errors (above), clustered on countries (below). Significance: * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation method: weighted least squares. Weights: Inverse of standard errors
of conditional culture indicators. Country fixed effects always included.
Table 2.4: Firm Performance and Trust, OLS Estimates, Unconditional Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Firms Persons Employed
Schooling 1960 -4243.30 -4410.98** -3647.66 -18485.56 -21958.26 -14723.41
(1870.39)** (1942.78)** (2273.92) (7524.53)** (8862.36)** (10525.67)
(1263.69)** (1849.25)* (1356.09)* (5327.91)** (9156.27)* (6924.21)
Urbanization 1850 5537.87 5776.77 5881.39 31287.03 31776.89 33052.41
(1187.33)*** (1220.41)*** (1183.87)*** (8460.88)*** (5973.42)*** (5837.96)***




PC Culture 1116.69 12582.50
(1947.29) (9206.22)
(1884.94) (8567.25)
PC Cult. Pos. 2162.63 18106.19
(2507.50) (12659.70)
(1902.28) (8998.91)
N 40 42 42 40 42 42
Adj. R2 0.17 0.21 0.23 0.12 0.21 0.23
In parentheses: robust standard errors (above), clustered on countries (below). Significance: * p <0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Estimation method: OLS. Country fixed effects always included.
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Table 2.5: Firm Performance and Trust, OLS Estimates, Conditional Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Firms Persons Employed
Schooling 1960 -4830.05 -4748.53 -5258.24 -20332.98 -19972.58 -18219.65
(2413.56)* (2898.91) (2785.56)* (10052.45)* (12473.10) (11287.57)
(2161.51)* (2125.13)* (2702.90) (5074.74)** (6886.39)** (3639.64)***
Urbanization 1850 4491.26*** 4539.36*** 4725.21*** 28069.16*** 28498.31*** 28507.62***
(1072.52)*** (1021.23)*** (1064.33)*** (7477.50)*** (7274.42)*** (7203.46)***




PC Culture 153360.44 1408102.42
(186275.11) (956877.91)
(165885.13) (1039783.91)
PC Cult. Pos. -29359.40 632476.88
(146325.22) (765613.19)
(186177.41) (996386.09)
N 40 40 40 40 40 40
Adj. R2 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.14 0.15 0.11
Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation method: weighted least squares. Weights: Inverse of standard of
conditional culture indicators. Country fixed effects always included.
doubt on either the positive association in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, and the lack of
association in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. Therefore, I proceed to present estimates
from the use of the instrumental variables.
Table 2.6 presents the reduced form that connects the instrumental vari-
ables to the innovation variables of interest. If past literary and early institu-
tions are correlated with trust, and if trust affects innovation, some correla-
tion between the instruments and the innovation variables is expected. This
is broadly confirmed. From the table, literacy rates and early institutions
are indeed correlated with patent applications. However, this correlation is
weaker for the share of non-scientists and engineers.
A different, and less favorable, picture is seen with respect to the firm
performance variables. In these reduced form estimates, literacy and the
first principal component of institutions have no significant effect on the
number of active firms. However, there is weak evidence that literacy has an
effect on the number of persons employed. This lack of association, however,
is not necessarily an indication that the estimation strategy is flawed, since
it may be caused by a lack of correlation between culture and the share of
non-scientists and engineers or the number of firms, and not by a lack of
correlation between the instruments and culture. In any case, the first-stage
results should settle this matter.
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Table 2.6: The Influence of Literacy and Early Institutions on Innovation, Reduced
Form Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patent Applications Non-Scientists and Engineers
Schooling 1960 -0.24 -0.04 -0.91 -0.03 -0.00 -0.03
(2.36) (1.08) (2.66) (0.02)* (0.02) (0.02)*
(2.47) (0.90) (2.82) (0.01)** (0.01) (0.02)*
Urbanization 1850 -2.76 -2.45 -3.14 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(1.23)** (1.73) (1.45)** (0.01)* (0.02) (0.01)
(1.23)* (2.08) (1.74) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Literacy 4.85 4.27 -0.03 -0.03
(0.98)*** (1.14)*** (0.02)* (0.02)*
(0.90)*** (0.43)*** (0.02) (0.02)
PC Institutions 62.63 39.66 -0.24 0.01
(37.15)* (39.95) (0.13)* (0.14)
(16.58)*** (31.79) (0.08)** (0.14)
N 60 62 60 59 61 59
Adj. R2 0.58 0.56 0.59 0.65 0.55 0.65
In parentheses: robust standard errors (above), clustered on countries (below). Significance: * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation method: OLS. Country fixed effects always included.
Table 2.7: The Influence of Literacy and Early Institutions on Firm Performance, Reduced Form Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Firms Persons Employed
Schooling 1960 -7032.99 -4383.09 -7098.68 -40868.39 -20449.39 -40089.14
(4544.41) (1850.20)** (4553.16) (20133.98)* (7255.37)*** (19607.19)**
(4931.37) (1297.37)** (4224.74) (20277.22) (6090.59)** (15368.62)*
Urbanization 1850 5117.91 5795.56 5116.71 26507.42 32528.86 26521.57
(1617.01)*** (1107.73)*** (1628.77)*** (7683.40)*** (7715.14)*** (7813.59)***
(1263.56)** (1284.43)** (1281.02)** (8666.57)** (10160.87)** (8751.35)**
Literacy 3666.50 3618.39 30978.85 31549.53
(2824.03) (2905.81) (15886.48)* (16941.03)*
(1928.36) (2934.06) (7527.57)** (12280.96)*
PC Institutions 23864.91 2877.75 160765.29 -34135.50
(67437.06) (65652.04) (326126.14) (295234.50)
(28673.02) (64578.56) (77008.07) (289166.63)
N 41 42 41 41 42 41
Adj. R2 0.26 0.21 0.24 0.33 0.16 0.31
In parentheses: robust standard errors (above), clustered on countries (below). Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Estimation method: OLS. Country fixed effects always included.
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Table 2.8: Early Literacy and Political Institutions, and Trust, First Stage Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trust Conditional Trust
Schooling 1960 0.26 -0.11 0.25 -0.10 -0.16 -0.10
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.21) (0.16) (0.21)
(0.20) (0.12) (0.19) (0.17) (0.14) (0.17)
Urbanization 1850 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.05
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05)** (0.07)
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)** (0.06)
Literacy 0.31 0.30 0.25 0.26
(0.10)*** (0.11)*** (0.07)*** (0.08)***
(0.12)** (0.11)** (0.10)** (0.10)**
PC Institutions 2.65 0.76 1.18 -0.23
(2.28) (1.98) (1.53) (1.38)
(2.66) (1.84) (2.34) (1.69)
N 65 67 65 65 67 65
Adj. R2 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.63 0.57 0.62
In parentheses: robust standard errors (above), clustered on countries (below). Significance: * p
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation method: OLS in columns (1)-(3), weighted OLS
in columns (4)-(6) with inverse of standard errors of conditional culture (principal component) as
weights. Country fixed effects always included.
The first-stage results are reported in Tables 2.8, 2.9, and A.11. The
first of these tables shows the effects of the instruments on trust. Literacy
exhibits a strong effect on both the unconditional and conditional measures
of trust, which is not seen with early institutions. This restricts the number
of instruments in the second-stage estimation. Moreover, it prevents the use
of an over-identification test. However, by restricting the instrument set to
just the literacy variable, the risk of weak instruments vanishes.
For the broader measures of culture, as Table 2.9 shows, both instruments
are significant for the unconditional measure of culture, whereas for the con-
ditional measure, once again, only literacy is significant. As before, weak
instruments are not a concern: the F-test statistics for excluded instruments
are 12.71 and 9.56 for the unconditional and conditional variables, respec-
tively. Note, however, that both instruments are used in the first case, but
only literacy is used in the second. Results for the positive components of
culture are similar and reported in the Appendix. It is of note, however, that
the F-test statistic is even higher, at 34.90.
Table 2.10 presents the second-stage results for the effect of culture on
1Table A.1 can be found in Appendix A
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Table 2.9: Early Literacy and Political Institutions, and Cultural Traits, First Stage
Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PC Culture Conditional PC Culture
Schooling 1960 0.38 0.10 0.32 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.35) (0.26) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.28) (0.10) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Urbanization 1850 0.11 0.09 0.03 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.15) (0.20) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.14) (0.17) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Literacy 0.67 0.48 0.01 0.01
(0.17)*** (0.15)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
(0.32)* (0.18)** (0.00)* (0.00)*
PC Institutions 12.34 10.16 0.06 0.03
(2.86)*** (3.06)*** (0.03)* (0.03)
(3.40)*** (2.24)*** (0.05) (0.03)
N 65 69 67 65 67 65
Adj. R2 0.70 0.72 0.76 0.65 0.60 0.65
In parentheses: robust standard errors (above), clustered on countries (below). Significance: * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation method: OLS in columns (1)-(3), weighted OLS in columns
(4)-(6) with inverse of standard errors of conditional culture (principal component) as weights. Country
fixed effects always included.
patent applications. Culture in all of its measures has a significant effect
on patents. The effects are economically relevant as well. Recall that the
difference in trust between Sicily and Lombardy is roughly 20 percentage
points. Then, the point estimate of 15.47 implies that if Sicily were to have
the same level of trust of Lombardy, it would, per million inhabitants in
the active population, increase patent applications by 310 patents. This
amounts to more than the average patent applications per million inhabitants
(209.95) and to ten times the patent applications in Sicily (32.09). Effects are
similar for the other measures of culture. The difference in the first principal
component of culture between Sicily and Lombardy is of roughly 50 points,
so an estimate that is roughly half of the one attached to trust produces an
effect on patent applications that is approximately of the same size.
Columns (3) and (5) in Table 2.10, use both instruments in the first stage.
Therefore, the assumption of valid instruments can be tested through overi-
dentification tests. The Hansen J statistics for columns (3) and (5), respec-
tively, are 0.173 and 0.553, with associated p-values of 0.6774 and 0.4570.
Therefore, the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions cannot be
rejected, which is evidence that the instruments are valid.
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Table 2.10: Culture and Patent Applications, Second Stage Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patent Applications
Schooling 1960 -3.93 2.48 -3.60 0.00 0.08 3.70
(4.34) (4.24) (2.87) (3.63) (2.14) (3.75)
(4.79) (4.97) (3.05) (3.55) (2.21) (4.50)
Urbanization 1850 -3.36 -3.62 -3.50 -2.35 -2.34 -3.28
(1.46)** (1.62)** (1.60)** (1.60) (1.49) (1.45)**




PC Culture 7.25 907.52
(2.04)*** (293.64)***
(2.74)** (426.84)*
PC Culture Pos. 7.28 824.94
(2.19)*** (274.49)***
(2.57)** (306.76)**
Conditional? No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 60 60 60 60 60 60
Adj. R2 0.61 0.62 0.66 0.65 0.73 0.69
In parentheses: robust standard errors (above), clustered on countries (below). Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation method: 2SLS, weighted by the inverse of the conditional cultural variable in
columns (4) and (6). Country fixed effects always included. Instruments: literacy in columns (1),(2),(4), and
(6), literacy and PC institutions in columns (3) and (5).
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Table 2.11: Culture and Non-Scientists and Engineers, Second Stage Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-Scientists and Engineers
Schooling 1960 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)*** (0.03)**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.04)
Urbanization 1850 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)* (0.01)** (0.01)




PC Culture -0.04 -6.38
(0.02)* (4.12)
(0.04) (6.78)
PC Culture Pos. -0.04 -5.79
(0.02)** (3.68)
(0.03) (5.26)
Conditional? No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 59 59 59 59 59 59
Adj. R2 0.93 0.93 0.96 0.94 0.97 0.95
In parentheses: robust standard errors (above), clustered on countries (below). Significance:
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation method: 2SLS, weighted by the inverse of
the conditional cultural variable in columns (4) and (6). Country fixed effects always included.
Instruments: literacy in columns (1),(2),(4), and (6), literacy and PC institutions in columns (3)
and (5).
Table 2.11 presents results for the second stage relative to the number of
non-scientists and engineers as a percentage of the active population. In
this case, culture, particularly in its conditional variables, does not seem
to have a large effect on the dependent variable: many estimates are not
significant at the usual levels, and those that are are only significant at the
10% level. However, it is reassuring that the point estimates have all the
predicted negative sign. Moreover, even when the effects are statistically
distinguishable from zero, these estimates are economically relevant. For
instance, the aforementioned 20 percentage-point difference between trust in
Sicily and Lombardy amounts to an decrease in the percentage of scientists
and engineers of 2 percentage points, which is arguably sizable given that
around 5% of the labor force is comprised of scientists and engineers.
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Table 2.12: Culture and Number of Firms, Second Stage Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Firms
Schooling 1960 -13591.66 -7004.91 -9935.83 -8979.43 -7285.09 -5603.24
(6765.42)** (4820.62) (5333.44)* (5613.95) (4125.15)* (5208.66)
(7010.80) (6514.90) (3150.66) (5609.68) (3501.04) (6378.82)
Urbanization 1850 3974.54 3779.81 5487.84 4363.38 6001.11 3743.55
(1940.31)** (1315.30)*** (1529.41)*** (1193.49)*** (1223.60)*** (1586.15)**




PC Culture 4847.05 816040.63
(4086.65)*** (525829.80)
(1651.89)** (421556.95)
PC Culture Pos. 4646.95 703188.47
(4669.04) (513824.63)
(1735.65)* (391215.74)
Conditional? No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 39 39 41 39 41 39
Adj. R2 0.42 0.62 0.64 0.64 0.68 0.60
In parentheses: robust standard errors (above), clustered on countries (below). Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. Estimation method: 2SLS, weighted by the inverse of the conditional cultural variable in columns (4) and (6). Country fixed
effects always included. Instruments: literacy in columns (1),(2),(4), and (6), literacy and PC institutions in columns (3) and (5).
Once again, in columns (3) and (5) two instrumental variables are used
and, thus, overidentifying restrictions can be tested. The Hansen J statistic
is now 1.785 with a p-value of 0.1815 for column (3), and 2.127 with a p-value
of 0.1447 for column (5). Once again, there is evidence that the instruments
are valid.
Second stage results for firm performance are presented in Tables 2.12 and
2.13. The first of the tables presents results relative to the number of active
firms. These are stronger than the ones relative to the share of non-scientists
and engineers, but weaker than the ones relative to patents. In particular,
trust seems to have a positive effect on the number of firms at the 10% level
overall, and at the 1% for clustered standard errors in its conditional measure.
These effects are sizable: the 20-point difference in trust between Sicily and
Lombardy translates into 282,469 more firms, which is more than four times
greater than the average number of 65,416 firms per region. Moreover, the
unconditional first principal component of the culture variables also has a
very significant positive effect on the number of active firms. Finally, notice
that the sample size is smaller in these regressions, which tends to increase
standard errors.
From Table 2.13, trust in general has a positive effect on the number of
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Table 2.13: Culture and Persons Employed, Second Stage Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Persons Employed
Schooling 1960 -91506.86 -38539.67 -63121.92 -55982.96 -41433.07 -27477.17
(43304.10)** (35912.08) (24352.33)*** (33340.00)* (17925.26)** (30350.69)
(28032.33)** (31292.44) (6706.96)*** (26727.15) (13275.32)** (41289.48)
Urbanization 1850 18878.19 22073.55 29816.88 27108.00 33929.24 21867.42
(13930.18) (9316.09)** (6715.98)*** (8202.47)*** (4397.29)*** (9450.77)**




PC Culture 38932.45 6898604.27
(22091.51)* (3440918.00)**
(20766.35) (4285287.68)
PC Culture Pos. 36665.40 5946147.87
(24908.65) (3293567.08)*
(18030.06) (3050192.95)
Conditional? No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 39 39 41 39 41 39
Adj. R2 -0.25 0.23 0.50 0.31 0.59 0.25
In parentheses: robust standard errors (above), clustered on countries (below). Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Estimation method: 2SLS, weighted by the inverse of the conditional cultural variable in columns (4) and (6). Country fixed effects
always included. Instruments: literacy in columns (1),(2),(4), and (6), literacy and PC institutions in columns (3) and (5).
persons employed. In addition, there is some evidence that the first principal
component of the culture variables has an effect as well, at least when robust
standard errors are used. These effects, once again are sizable: for an average
of 273,181.8 persons employed per region, increasing the level of trust in
Sicily to the one in Lombardy would cause an increase in persons employed
of more than this average. In particular, given the 116,029.18 point estimate,
this increase would be more than two-million workers.
Once again, in each of these tables, columns (3) and (5) present results
when two instrumental variables are used, enabling the use of overidenti-
fying restrictions. Regarding the number of firms, Hansen J statistics are,
respectively, 1.391 and 1.380 with associated p-values of 0.2383 and 0.2401.
For the number of persons employed, these statistics are 2.927 and 2.930,
respectively, with p-values 0.0871 and 0.0869. Even though the latter results
are weaker, there is still evidence that the instruments are valid.
In general, then, trust in particular, and culture in general is causally
associated with innovation, but not with all measures of it. In addition,
trust is also causes more numerous and larger firms, as measured by the
number of employees. These latter results are weaker, but it must be taken
into account that their sample size is smaller. Before revising these facts
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and discussing its consequences, it is useful to go through some robustness
checks.
2.3.4 Robustness Checks
Given that early institutions were not used as an instrumental variables in all
regressions, it is worthwhile to check if it has by itself an effect on innovation.
This should allow for smaller standard errors and tighter estimates, as well
as controlling for a potentially important variable.
Moreover, the identification strategy used relies on the assumption that
the instruments, once the effect of culture on innovation is controlled for,
do not have a direct effect on either patent applications or the percentage
of scientists and engineers. This assumption cannot be tested for all instru-
ments. However, as a check it is possible to include instruments as regressors
in the second stage. If the instruments are valid, the instrument included
as a regressor should have no effect on the dependent variable, exhibiting
coefficients close to zero. In addition, the causal effect estimated with the
included instrument should not change much relative to the other models.
Therefore, including early institutions as a regressor in the second stages
provides evidence of how good the estimates from the use of literacy as an
instrument are.
Tables A.2, A.3, A.4, and A.5 (in Appendix A) show the estimates from
such regressions. As expected, early institutions do not have any effect on
either patent applications or the percentage of scientists and engineers on any
of the specifications. Moreover, the coefficients associated with culture are
roughly of the same magnitude as the ones reported in previous tables. As
an example, the effect of unconditional trust on patent applications changes
from 15.47 to 14.71, whereas on scientists and engineers changes from 0.10
to 0.11.




It is reasonably established that culture plays a role in economic development.
The interaction between social capital, political institutions, and economic
performance has been recurring in the literature since, at least, the work
of Putnam et al. (1994). More recently, the effects of culture on economic
performance were shown to be causal. However, the exact mechanisms that
operate to make countries with higher levels of social capital more prosperous
is still unknown. This chapter posits and confirms that an increase in market
activities that boost the R&D sector may be part of this effect.
First, it builds a theory to incorporate an equilibrium relationship be-
tween interpersonal trust, market activities, and production decisions into
a macroeconomic endogenous growth model. In particular, higher levels of
trust induce households to engage more in market activities, freeing labor
to be supplied outside the household. Given knowledge spillovers and scale
effects, this increases the growth rate of knowledge, and shifts labor away
from the production of final goods.
One main caveat of the theory developed here is that trust is taken to
be a parameter. It exhibits no dynamics and is not a result achieved in
equilibrium. Whether these issues can be incorporated into the model in a
tractable way that still allows for testable predictions to be derived is a matter
for future work. In addition, it seems natural to take interpersonal trust,
and culture in general, as a parameter, since they are used as independent
variables in the empirical analysis.
A richer interaction between trust and the model economy here is possible
through many avenues. For example, as in Aghion et al. (2010), trust can
emerge as an equilibrium choice of individuals in an environment where the
amount of regulation in the economy must be determined. In addition, it
is possible to model trust as in Bloom et al. (2012). In this setting, higher
levels of trust allow managers to lead larger teams, which increases firm size.
However, this approach, that stems from Garicano (2000), treats trust as an
exogenous, parametric feature, which may not be desirable. Studying these
implications is also a potential avenue of future research.
Then, it uses data on European regions to test the implications of this
model. In general, social capital is associated with (i) higher levels of inno-
vation output, as measured by patent applications to the EPO per million
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inhabitants in the active population, (ii) a decrease in the share of the la-
bor force comprised not of scientists nor of engineers, (iii) a larger number
of active firms, and (iv) a greater number of persons employed. These are
interpreted as empirical support for the model.
There are also good arguments to believe that the estimates presented here
are causal. The estimation strategy exploits institutional variations that oc-
cur within European countries. This is possible due to accidents in European
history, mainly the unification of regions that two centuries ago were inde-
pendent polities and changing European borders. Then, once country fixed
effects are used, variation in early variables become an exogenous source
of variation in culture only, and can be used in an instrumental variables
framework. Overidentifying restriction tests present evidence that these in-
struments are valid.
There are, however, caveats in the empirics here presented. Besides the
usual issues when historical variables are used as instrumental variables, a
first concern is data availability and the resulting sample size. The identifica-
tion strategy relies on particular occurrences in European history, restricting
the number of observations available. As a consequence, standard errors be-
come inflated, and some effects may not be distinguishable from zero. While
this is not a concern regarding the estimates related to patents, it may have
been the case for the scientists and engineers estimates. A lack of data and




SOCIAL PROTECTION, BARRIERS TO
TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION, AND TFP
GROWTH
3.1 Introduction
A main result of the research in economic growth is that in the long-run
a country’s living standard is determined by its productivity, and grows
through innovation. If innovation is so precious for economic development,
rich countries should be known for having incentive structures that greatly
reward entrepreneurial effort. Interestingly, this is not the case. Many of the
richest countries in the world are actually known for providing a high level
of social protection, the main examples being the Scandinavian countries.
If these countries provide such a big social safety net, how can they main-
tain high rates of economic growth? This chapter tries to answer this ques-
tion by studying the interaction between social protection policies, barriers
to technology adoption, and total factor productivity (TFP) growth. Its
main result is that some countries are able to enjoy high levels of economic
performance and also of social protection due to the presence of knowledge
spillovers in the world economy. Since knowledge flows from one country to
another, countries with high levels of social protection can enjoy high growth
rates by keeping low barriers to technology adoption. The disincentives of
an extensive social safety net are compensated by large flows of knowledge.
I explore this issue first theoretically and then empirically. On the theoret-
ical side, I build a model of endogenous technological change in which a social
planner chooses between a reward structure that provides to entrepreneurs
either high-powered incentives or consumption insurance. Entrepreneurs,
then, must decide how much effort to put into the development of new ideas.
Since effort is privately known, this context leads to a moral hazard prob-
lem. At the same time, to generate technological progress, entrepreneurs
may choose between adopting technologies from abroad or developing new,
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original ideas. Then, I add barriers to technology adoption in the form of an
extra cost incurred when labor employed in these adoption activities.
A first result of the model is a type of economic policy trilemma. A country
can only achieve two out of the three following policy goals: high growth
rates, high levels of social protection, or high protection of domestic firms
through barriers to technology adoption.
Moreover, social protection policies and barriers to technology adoption
have different effects on different components of TFP growth. Social pro-
tection policies decrease entrepreneurial effort overall. Therefore, they de-
crease TFP growth in general. However, the presence of knowledge spillovers
implies that a portion of TFP growth is independent from entrepreneurial
effort. As a consequence, the detrimental effects of social protection policies
are greater on the portion of TFP growth that occurs only through the cre-
ation of original ideas, that is, the portion that excludes technology adoption
and knowledge spillovers.
On the other hand, barriers to technology adoption are more targeted than
social protection polices. In particular, they shift entrepreneurial effort from
technology adoption towards the creation of original ideas. Therefore, an
increase in barriers to technology adoption will decrease overall TFP growth,
but will promote the creation of original ideas, increasing the growth of TFP
net of knowledge spillovers.
I explore these results empirically. To do so, in addition to analyzing TFP
growth, I construct a measure of TFP growth net of knowledge spillovers.
Using a panel of countries, the results derived from the model are generally
not rejected.
The research here is related to many different literatures. A first strand is
the literature that explains how market-based economies can vary in terms
of social policies. The works of Hall and Soskice (2001), Crouch (2009), and
Esping-Andersen (1990) develop in political science a literature on “varieties
of capitalism”. In general, these works establish that there is not only one set
of economic institutions that are compatible with a market-based economy
and private property, while also offering a taxonomy of different capitalist
systems. In particular, Aoki (2001) emphasizes how connections on an inter-
national level might enable these differences in policies.
On the side of economics, the consequences and causes of social protection
policies have also been explored. For example, Acemoglu and Pischke (1998)
47
provide an explanation for differences in labor market institutions based on
multiple equilibria involving firms that training their workers. Similarly,
Landier (2005) explains differences in entrepreneurial risk taking. A differ-
ent explanation is provided by Algan and Cahuc (2009), where social capital
plays key role on determining levels of unemployment insurance. Finally,
Bénabou and Tirole (2006) build a model to explain how different beliefs
regarding material justice may arise, while Bénabou (2005) explicitly con-
siders the effects of international technological diffusion. On the side of the
consequences of these different institutions, Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998)
explores how greater social safety nets affect unemployment levels ans spells
in Europe.
Another strand of related literature regards international technology dif-
fusion, knowledge spillovers, and barriers to technology adoption. The role
of technology diffusion on economic growth has been analyzed extensively,
since a seminal contribution by Nelson and Phelps (1966) that emphasizes
the role played by human capital. Following that, Howitt (2000) explores the
impacts of technology diffusion in a context of endogenous growth, which is
a topic further expanded by Acemoglu et al. (2006). On the empirical side,
there is also research exploring the size and effects of technological spillovers.
The seminal contribution is given by Coe and Helpman (1995), which was
updated by Coe et al. (2009). Finally, Parente and Prescott (1994) begin a
literature on the role played by barriers to technology adoption.
Following this introduction, the next section builds a theory to study the
interplay between TFP growth, social protection policies, and barriers to
technology adoption. It generates differential effects of the two latter on
different components of TFP growth. After this, these results are explored
empirically in the section that follows.
3.2 Theory
To study the interrelationship between TFP growth, social protection, and
barriers to technology adoption, I develop below a model to take all of these
issues into account.
This model is comprised of three different components. The first one is a
model of endogenous technological change in which a follower country ben-
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efits from knowledge spillovers from ideas created in a leading economy.
The second component is a moral hazard problem: entrepreneurs in the
follower country must exert a private amount of effort in order to improve
their chances of success. In environments with high social protection, since
the social planner is unable to observe effort and, thus, allocates consump-
tion according to success, entrepreneurial effort decreases and so does en-
trepreneurial success. Finally, the third component is an allocation decision
in the research and development (R&D) sector, where in order to allocate
labor in the adoption of foreign technology, entrepreneurs must pay a cost.
This cost is be interpreted as a barrier to technology adoption.
The theory presented below is derived from the work in Acemoglu et al.
(2017). The work in Acemoglu et al. (2017) aims to characterize an asym-
metric equilibrium regarding social protection policies across countries. From
a model of endogenous technological growth with knowledge spillovers and
a moral hazard problem, the paper analyzes a setup in which J countries
must each decide individually on a sequence of social protection policies.
In this context, the growth rate of knowledge for the entire world, i.e. the
J countries, arises endogenously from the social protection decisions world-
wide. Given the presence of knowledge spillovers and technology diffusion,
these individual decisions and the knowledge growth caused by them imply
that countries’ choices are interdependent and, therefore, generate strategic
considerations. The paper then proceeds to study pure Markov perfect equi-
libria in this economy. Under general assumptions, its main result is that the
world equilibrium is asymmetric: some countries choose low levels of social
protection in order to incentivize innovation, while others choose high levels
of social protection to provide consumption insurance to its households. The
latter group of countries, however, is only able to provide consumption insur-
ance without sacrificing much economic growth because there exist countries
that reward innovation, and the new ideas created by them diffuse due to
technology spillovers. In addition, an equilibrium in which all countries pro-
vide social protection entails slow economic growth.
One of the main caveats of the work in Acemoglu et al. (2017) is the ab-
sence of barriers to technology adoption. In a literature that stems from
Parente and Prescott (1994), not only such barriers are observed from an
empirical perspective, but they are also sufficient to account for the sizable
differences in income per capita across countries. Therefore, ignoring the
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presence of barriers to technology adoption, while a reasonable simplifica-
tion for pure theoretical purposes, is a very restrictive assumption from an
empirical perspective. Moreover, since social protection policies can coexist
with high rates of economic growth only when there are knowledge spillovers,
the presence of such barriers is a key feature that countries must take into
account when deciding the extent of their social protection nets. In sum, any
work that aims to either build upon Acemoglu et al. (2017) or characterize
their results empirically must take into account the existence of barriers to
technology adoption, and it is precisely such reasoning that motivates their
inclusion in the theory developed below.
On the other hand, since different levels of social protection policies can be
observed from different countries trough time, from an empirical perspective
they can be taken as given. In addition, most countries can be thought of as
small economies relative to the world technology frontier, with a few excep-
tions, the U.S. being the most notable one. Therefore, if the ultimate goal is
to characterize empirically the consequences of social protection on economic
growth, one does not need to focus on how the expansion of knowledge in
the world arises endogenously from the social protection decisions of many
countries. In particular, it is not necessary to focus on a social planner that
maximizes average utility like in Acemoglu et al. (2017). Instead, it is possi-
ble to just take social protection policies and barriers to technology adoption
as given.
Therefore, the model developed below, simultaneously expands and simpli-
fies the one in Acemoglu et al. (2017). On one hand, it expands the original
model by incorporating barriers to technology adoption, as modeled by an
extra cost associated with using high-skilled labor to adopt technology from
abroad. On the other hand, it simplifies the original model by restricting
the economic environment to two countries, a technology leader and a tech-
nology follower, and focusing of the decisions of the follower country. In
particular, it assumes that the follower economy cannot affect the growth
rate of knowledge in the frontier (the leading country).
In what follows, I first describe the economic environment. After that, I
characterize how different levels of social protection translate into different
reward structures, explore their incentive implications, and derive the result-
ing allocations from these different policies. Finally, I explore the implica-
tions of this model economy in terms of innovation possibilities, including
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the consequences of barriers to technology adoption. Ultimately, the theory
that follows makes explicit the trade-offs that policy makers face, and is very
useful to guide the empirical exercise conducted in Section 3.3.
3.2.1 The Model Economy
Consider a model economy in infinite-horizon time and consisting of two
countries: a technological leader, and a small follower. Both economies are
populated by a continuum of measure one of agents. Instead of infinitely-lived
agents, however, suppose that there are non-overlapping generations of agents
who live for a period ∆t long, work, produce, consume, and die. Assume also
that there is no international trade. The focus here is to describe the policy
options of the follower economy and its consequences to TFP growth. In
particular, I consider the limit economy as ∆t→ 0.
Nevertheless, it is useful to begin by describing the technology leader. In
this country, the level of technology, which amounts to the world stock of
knowledge, is denoted by A(t) and grows exogenously at a rate gA. There,
the population is constant, so that gA is also the rate of output growth,
output per capita, and consumption.
Turning to the follower economy, suppose that it produces a final good
using labor and N(t) varieties of intermediate goods (or blueprints for pro-









where L is the amount of (low-skill) labor employed, and x(ν, t) is the amount
of intermediate good ν employed. Notice, then, that N(t) in fact denotes the
measure of a continuum of infinitesimally small intermediate goods. These
intermediate goods are assumed to be non-durable because they need to be
produced every period. Moreover, to each intermediate good ν, there exists
a corresponding blueprint explaining its production, which implies that N(t)
is also the number of such blueprints. While the intermediate goods are non-
durable, the blueprints for producing them survive, and the increase in the
number of these blueprints, N(t), is the source of economic growth. Finally,
the term 1/(1− β) acts as a normalization.
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Each blueprint ν is owned by an entrepreneur. This blueprint provides
the entrepreneur with a perpetual patent for the production of intermediate
good ν, so this intermediate is sold at a monopoly price denoted by px(ν, t).
Its production, of the other hand, incurs a constant marginal cost of ψ in
terms of the final good.
To obtain a blueprint, the entrepreneur must perform research and devel-
opment (R&D) activities. In performing R&D, the entrepreneur must exert
a level of effort ei(t) that is either high, ei(t) = 1 or low ei(t) = 0. High
effort costs γ > 0 units of time, while low effort has no time cost. However,
R&D is a risky process: it can either be successful or unsuccessful. When
effort is high, the probability of success is q1; whereas when effort is low, the
probability of success is q0. It is natural to assume that high effort is asso-
ciated with a greater probability of success, so I assume that q1 > q0. The
amount of effort that the entrepreneur exerts is also assumed to be private
information.
The utility of an entrepreneur i is given by
U(Ci(t), ei(t)) =
{Ci(t) [1− γei(t)]}1−θ − 1
1− θ
, (3.2)
where θ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Entrepreneurs can also simultaneously supply two types of labor. The
first type is low-skilled labor that is used in the production of the final good
shown in equation (3.1). The second is high-skilled labor, that is used in the
research and development process. The total income of the entrepreneur is
therefore given by its entrepreneurial income together with wage incomes for
each type of labor. The assumption of two different types of labor simplifies
the analysis by preventing that changes in the marginal productivity of labor
in one sector, say R&D, have an effect on labor allocations in the other sector.
It can also be justified by the fact that research and development demands
a different set of skills than the production of a final good. Finally, it should
be noted that this assumption is not new in endogenous growth theory: in
fact, it is an assumption used by Romer (1990).
A successful entrepreneur generates new ideas according to how much high-
skilled labor it devotes to two types of activities. The first one is technol-
ogy adoption, while the second one is the improvement of old ideas (or the
creation of original ideas). Technology adoption depends on the level of
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technology of the technology leading country, A(t), and on the amount of
high-skilled labor employed in this activity, HA(t). The improvement of old
ideas depends on the technological level of the follower country, N(t), and on
labor employed in this activity, HR(t). Moreover, it is assumed that it is eas-
ier to adopt new technologies than to create new ones based on the current
stock of knowledge. This assumption is captured by a parameter α > 1 that
increases the marginal productivity of high-skilled labor used in technology
adoption.
Then, for a general parameter η > 0 that characterizes how productive




where φ ∈ (0, 1). It is clear, then, that new ideas are generated through a
combination of technology adoption, dictated by (αHA(t)A(t))
φ, and creation
of new ideas, dictated by (HR(t)N(t))
1−φ. Also, notice that the equation













where the fraction A(t)/N(t) can be interpreted as the technology gap be-
tween the leading country and the follower. Then, for a given A(t), increases
in N(t) decrease the contribution of technology adoption to the develop-
ment of new ideas. In other words, entrepreneurial success will lead to faster
progress the farther from the technological frontier the follower country is.
In addition, suppose that an unsuccessful entrepreneur generates no new
ideas. Then, define the aggregate amount of entrepreneurial effort by e(t) =∫
ei(t)di. While some entrepreneurs succeed in generating new ideas and
some don’t, there is no R&D uncertainty in the aggregate. This implies that
the aggregate increase in the stock of ideas is deterministic and given by
Ṅ(t) = {q1e(t) + q0 [1− e(t)]}η (αHA(t)A(t))φ (HR(t)N(t))1−φ . (3.5)
Finally, entrepreneurs in this economy also face direct barriers to technol-
ogy adoption. In particular, let h(t) be the wage rate for high-skilled labor.
These barriers to technology adoption take the form of an extra cost τ of
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hiring high-skilled labor to perform to adopt foreign technology.
3.2.2 Reward Structures
Instead of a decentralized equilibrium, there exists a social planner in this
economy who chooses the reward structure that entrepreneurs face. Recall
that there is a marginal cost of ψ units of the final good to produce one
unit of a given intermediate good ν. Concretely, then, this social planner
takes the amount of output net of the amount used to produce intermediate
goods, and chooses a reward structure to allocate this net output between
entrepreneurs. Given that effort is private information, it is impossible for
this social planner to allocate output in accordance to effort, and so reward
structures must depend on whether entrepreneurs are successful or not.
Then, let R̃s(t) denote the income at time t of a successful entrepreneur,
and R̃u(t) denote the income at time t of an unsuccessful entrepreneur. Given
that entrepreneurs also supply both types of labor, their total income is
Ri(t) = R̃i(t) + w(t) + h(t), (3.6)
for i ∈ {s, u}, and where w(t) is the wage rate for low-skilled labor and h(t)
is the wage rate for high-skilled labor. Ultimately, it is total income Ri(t)
rather than just the entrepreneurial part R̃i(t) that is relevant for the welfare
of an entrepreneur, and, thus, that is the variable on which I focus.
A reward structure is then summarized by the ratio r(t) ≡ Rs(t)/Ru(t).
If r(t) = 1, both successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs receive the same
income and, therefore, there is perfect consumption insurance. In this case,
however, it is optimal for entrepreneurs to exert no effort in R&D, so e(t) = 0.
Therefore, it is clear that in order to provide incentives for entrepreneurs to
exert effort in the generation of new knowledge, it must be the case that r(t)
must be well above one to induce entrepreneurial effort.
In this context, the social planner chooses a sequence of reward structures
[r(t)]∞t=0. A natural assumption is to make this sequence the solution of an
inter-temporal maximization problem, in which the planner, given a rate of
time discount ρ maximizes a function of entrepreneurial utility. A simple
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This is the approach taken by Acemoglu et al. (2017), that focuses on how
these reward structures can arise endogenously in a game with J countries.
The approach here, however, is to explore the consequences of these reward
structures, both theoretically and empirically. Therefore, instead of assuming
a maximizing social planner, I just consider the sequence [r(t)]∞t=0 to be given.
This does not mean, however, that any reward structure is to be analyzed.
As I argue below, the moral hazard problem in this economy implies that
only a set of feasible reward structures can occur.
In general, reward structures can either provide consumption insurance for
entrepreneurs or generate incentives for entrepreneurial effort. Consider first
the reward structure necessary to generate entrepreneurial effort. To ensure
e(t) = 1, the expected utility of high effort must exceed the expected utility




















This constraint results from a few considerations. The first one is that en-
trepreneurs will consume their entire income, which is given by Rs(t) with
probability q1 when they exert high effort and q0 when they exert low effort;
and by Ru with probability 1 − q1 when they exert high effort and 1 − q0
when they exert low effort. In addition, high effort also costs γ in terms of
time, which occurs regardless of entrepreneurial success.






(1− q0)− (1− q1)(1− γ)1−θ










where Λ denotes how “high-powered” incentives must be in order to generate
entrepreneurial effort. Since perfect consumption insurance is the result of
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r(t) = 1, Λ must be greater than one. In order to assure that this happens,
I make the following assumption.
assumption
Assumption 3.1
min{q1(1− γ)1−θ − q0, (1− q0)− (1− q1)(1− γ)1−θ} > 0
Of course, in order for a reward structure to incentivize effort, it must not
only satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint described above. It must
also be feasible, that is, satisfy the economy’s resource constraint as well. To
better explore this issue, it is necessary to understand the production choices
in this economy.
As described above, the social planner allocates the amount of the final
good that is left after the production of intermediate goods. However, the
total amount spent on intermediate goods depends on their price in terms
of final goods, which in turn depends on the demand for each intermediate
good. This demand comes from the production decision in the final goods
sector.

















where px(ν, t) is the price of intermediate good ν in terms of the final good.
The first-order condition for this problem with respect to labor yields the









whereas the first-order condition with respect to variety ν yields the demand
for this variety:
x(ν, t) = px(ν, t)−1/βL. (3.12)
This demand function is intuitive, since the elasticity of the demand for
variety ν is constant at εβ ≡ 1/β.
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Recall that the producer of variety ν is a monopolist, so it charges a price
px(ν, t) to maximize its profits, given the demand that it faces. Therefore its
problem is given by
max
px(ν,t)
π(ν, t) ≡ px(ν, t)x(ν, t)− ψx(ν, t)
s.t. x(ν, t) = px(ν, t)−1/βL,
(3.13)





which, given the isoelastic demand, involves a markup 1/(1 − β) over the
marginal cost.








This causes the total amount spent on intermediate goods to be∫ N(t)
0


















Notice that the total amount of intermediate goods is proportional to N(t),
the stock of knowledge. This is a consequence of symmetry across interme-































Finally, net output, that is, output not used in the production of intermediate
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goods, is



























for Ω ≡ [β/(1− β)][(ψ/(1− β)− (ψ/(1− β))(β−1)/β]L.
Taking net output into account, notice from entrepreneur utility that, if
the social planner is maximizing average utility, it would like to achieve as
much consumption insurance as possible while satisfying the incentive com-
patibility constraint. In this case, the incentive compatibility constraint will
hold with equality, and a feasible reward structure that satisfies it involves
q1R
s(t) + (1− q1)Ru(t) = ΩN(t), (3.19)
which combined with equation (3.9) yields the income received by successful
and unsuccessful entrepreneurs, respectively:
Rs(t) =
Λ
q1Λ + (1− q1)
ΩN(t) and Ru(t) =
1
q1Λ + (1− q1)
ΩN(t). (3.20)
Since net output is ΩN(t), the two expressions above make it clear that the
social planner ultimately decides which fraction of net income to allocate to
each type of entrepreneur.
Of course, it is also possible for the social planner to not provide enough
incentives for innovation. In this case, the best it can do is to provide full con-
sumption insurance and provide the same level of income to all entrepreneurs:
Ro(t) = ΩN(t). (3.21)
The expressions above make explicit the trade-off faced by the social plan-
ner. If it desires to induce effort, the best it can do is to adopt a reward
structure given by Rs(t) and Ru(t). On the other hand, if it wants to provide
consumption insurance, the best it can do is to adopt a reward structure
given by R0(t). Therefore, a general policy that it can adopt is to provide
complete consumption insurance to a fraction µ(t) of the entrepreneurs and
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to provide high-powered incentives to a fraction 1− µ(t) of them.
3.2.3 Innovation and Barriers to Technology Adoption
The choice of how extensive reward structures are, summarized by µ(t), will
have effects this economy’s stock of knowledge and its growth rate. At the
same time, since entrepreneurs face direct barriers to technology adoption,
these barriers are also of importance.
To pin down the innovation possibilities of this economy, then, start by
analyzing the problem that an entrepreneur faces. An entrepreneur chooses
the amount of high-skilled labor employed in technology adoption and the
creation of original ideas in order to maximize total technological growth.
High-skilled labor earns a wage of h(t), but, as a barrier to technology adop-
tion, there is an extra cost τ to hire labor in technology adoption. Thus,





1−φ − h(t)(1 + τ)Hi,A(t)
− h(t)Hi,R(t),
(3.22)
where the i subscript indicates an individual entrepreneur’s choice.
As usual, the solution to this maximization problem involves equating the
marginal productivity of high-skilled labor in each activity to its marginal




1−φ = h(t)(1 + τ), (3.23)
and the demand for labor in the creation of original ideas by the same en-
trepreneur satisfies
(1− φ)αA(t)φN(t)1−φHi,A(t)φHi,R(t)−φ = h(t). (3.24)
Free entry in the market for blueprints will cause the profit of any given
entrepreneur to go to zero. Then, since high-skilled labor is only used for
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technological progress, on the aggregate it must be the case that
HA(t) +HR(t) 6 H.
Therefore, combining this with the demands above in equations (3.23) and




φα + (1− φ)(1 + τ)
H = σ(τ)H, (3.25)
for σ(τ) ≡ φα/[φα + (1 − φ)(1 + τ)], and the amount of high-skilled labor
employed in the creation of original ideas is
HR(t) =
(1− φ)(1 + τ)
φα + (1− φ)(1 + τ)
H = (1− σ(τ))H. (3.26)
From the two expressions above, as expected, an increase in the size of bar-
riers to technology adoption τ will decrease the amount of labor employed in
technology adoption HA(t) and increase the amount of labor in the creation
of original ideas HR(t). In other words, σ(τ) is decreasing in τ .
To find the aggregate creation of new ideas, substitute equations (3.25)
and (3.26) into equation (3.5) to obtain
Ṅ(t) = {q1e(t)+q0 [1− e(t)]}η (αA(t))φN(t)1−φσ(τ)φ(1−σ(τ))1−φH, (3.27)
where {q1e(t) + q0 [1− e(t)]} is the probability of entrepreneurial success.
However, since now a fraction 1 − µ(t) of entrepreneurs face incentives to
innovate and exerts effort one, whereas a fraction µ(t) does not and exerts
effort zero, this probability of success can be rewritten as
q0µ(t) + q1 [1− µ(t)] .
Finally, then, the growth rate of technology can be written as
Ṅ(t) = {q0µ(t) + q1 [1− µ(t)]} η [ασ(τ)A(t)]φ [(1− σ(τ))N(t)]1−φH. (3.28)
The implications of this law of movement for the stock of knowledge in
this economy are explored next.
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3.2.4 Results
On one hand, the discussion above makes clear that there are three sources of
technological growth in this economy. The first one is entrepreneurial effort,
the second one is technology adoption, and the third one is the creation of
original ideas. On the other hand, equation (3.28) makes clear that this
process will be affected by three other features: social protection policies,
technological spillovers, and barriers to technology adoption. How are all
these features interrelated? Are there differential effects of each of the latter
on each of the former?
Before tackling these questions, it is useful to establish the effects of social
protection policies and barriers to technology adoption on the growth rate of
knowledge. Start by defining
Σ(τ) = ησ(τ)φ(1− σ(τ))1−φ, (3.29)
and then defining
Π(µ(t)) = q0µ(t) + q1 [1− µ(t)] . (3.30)
Therefore, technological progress can be written as
Ṅ(t) = Σ(τ)Π(µ(t))A(t)φN(t)1−φH. (3.31)
Equation (3.31) summarizes the main results. First, consider the effect of
higher levels of social protection, as interpreted as higher µ(t),
proposition





Proof: Notice that equation (3.28) implies
Ṅ(t)
N(t)
= Π(µ(t))η [ασ(τ)A(t)]φ [(1− σ(τ))N(t)]−φH.
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But from equation (3.30)
dΠ(µ(t))
dµ(t)
= q0 − q1,
which is negative, since q1 > q0. Then
∂Ṅ(t)/N(t)
∂µ(t)
= (q0 − q1)η [ασ(τ)A(t)]φ [(1− σ(τ))N(t)]−φH < 0. 
In addition, higher levels of barriers to technology adoption, that is, higher
τ , also decrease the growth rate of technological progress.
proposition
Proposition 3.2 Higher barriers to technology adoption decrease the growth











φσ(τ) +φ−1 (1− σ(τ))1−φ − σ(τ)φ(1− φ)(1− σ(τ)−φ
]
.
Since σ(τ) is decreasing in τ , the result holds if the term inside the square
brackets is positive. Alternatively
φσ(τ) +φ−1 (1− σ(τ))1−φ > σ(τ)φ(1− φ)(1− σ(τ))−φ,






and the result holds, since φ, σ(τ) ∈ (0, 1). 
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 provide the main intuition in regards to why some
countries are able to maintain high growth rates while having large social pro-
tection structures. This intuition is depicted in Figure 3.1. This figure depicts
different relationships between economic performance and social protection
for different levels of barriers to technology adoption.
If the barriers to technology adoption are small, it is possible to adopt
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Figure 3.1: The Relationship Between Economic Performance, Social
Protection, and Barriers to Technology Adoption
technology generated in the leader country without great costs, so that these
countries can grow fast even though they have reward structures that discour-
age innovation. In terms of Figure 3.1, for a given level of social protection,
decreasing barriers to technology adoption shifts up the relationship between
TFP growth and social protection, improving economic performance. These
countries can be best exemplified by western and northern European coun-
tries, most famously the countries in Scandinavia, like Sweden.
Simultaneously, the propositions also explain why some countries are able
to grow fast while protecting local firms. The key choice behind this is to
maintain low levels of social protection, so that the incentives to innovate
are high. In terms of Figure 3.1, this means that for a given decreasing line,
higher rates of growth can be obtained by moving upward along the line.
These countries can be best exemplified by the eastern Asian “tigers”, like
South Korea.
Finally, the results here also shed light on a third group: countries that
fail to grow fast. These countries must enjoy high levels of social protection
and at the same time maintain high barriers to technology adoption. Most
middle-income countries belong to this group.
In general, then, the results here indicate the existence of an economic
policy trilemma. Ultimately, only two of three different economic policies
are possible: policies that promote growth, social protection policies, and
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Figure 3.2: An Economic Policy Trilemma
protection of local firms through barriers to technology adoption. Figure 3.2
depicts this trilemma.
The presence of knowledge spillovers also causes different policy choices to
have differential effects on each source of technological progress. To under-
stand this, recall that the stock of knowledge N(t) grows due to technology
adoption and the creation of original ideas. Then, define by Ṅ∗ increase in




= {q0µ(t) + q1 [1− µ(t)]} η [(1− σ(τ))N(t)]1−φH.
(3.32)
This variable can be interpreted as how large was the contribution of the
creation of original ideas to technological progress.
Just like before, an increase in the level of social protection will decrease the
growth of N∗. This result is intuitive, since entrepreneurial effort decreases
with social protection and affects the entire process of creating new ideas.
However, since Ṅ∗ reflects how large is the growth of the knowledge stock
generated only by original ideas (and thus not generated by spillovers), the
adverse effects of social protection are larger on N∗.
proposition
Proposition 3.3 Higher levels of social protection decrease the growth rate
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φ > 1, the effects of higher levels of social protection






Proof: Notice that equation (3.32) implies
Ṅ∗(t)
N∗(t)
= Π(µ(t))η [(1− σ(τ))N(t)]−φH.
But from equation (3.30)
dΠ(µ(t))
dµ(t)
= q0 − q1,
which is negative, since q1 > q0. Then
∂Ṅ∗(t)/N(t)
∂µ(t)









which given the assumption of [αHA(t)A(t)]







However, even though greater levels of social protection decrease both Ṅ(t)
and Ṅ∗(t), greater barriers to barriers technology adoption will have a dif-
ferent effect on TFP growth and on TFP growth net of technology adoption.
This result has an intuitive explanation. Overall TFP growth results from a
combination of technology adoption and creation of original ideas. Barriers
to technology adoption adoption distort the optimal combination of these
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two components, artificially increasing the weight that new idea creation has
in this process. As a consequence, TFP growth decreases. On the other
hand, TFP growth net of technology adoption is simply TFP growth due to
new idea creation. Since larger barriers to technology adoption shift human
capital towards the creation of original ideas, the growth rate of TFP net of
the contribution of technology adoption increases.
proposition
Proposition 3.4 Higher barriers to technology adoption increase the growth




Proof: Notice that equation (3.32) implies
Ṅ∗(t)
N∗(t)




= −(1− φ)Π(µ(t))η [(1− σ(τ))N(t)]−φH(1− σ(τ))dσ(τ)
dτ
,
which is positive, since σ(τ) is decreasing in τ . 
In sum, the presence of knowledge spillovers enables economies to ex-
pand social protection policies without sacrificing much economic growth
as long as barriers to technology adoption are not very large. Otherwise,
large barriers to technology adoption will require high-powered incentives for
entrepreneurs, that is, small social protection nets, to maintain high TFP
growth. At the same time, social protection policies and barriers to technol-
ogy adoption, while being detrimental to TFP growth, will have differential
impacts on different components of technological progress.
I now examine whether these relationships are observed empirically. In
other words, what is the empirical support for the policy trilemma described
above? Does data support the predictions of Propositions 3.1 to 3.4? The
next section analyzes these issues.
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3.3 Evidence
In this section, I explore the empirical consequences of the results above. The
main goal is to identify the differential effects of social protection policies and
barriers to technology adoption on TFP growth.
First, therefore, I obtain two different measures of TFP. The first one is
simply overall TFP. The second one, however, is a measure of TFP that
excludes the contribution of technology adoption and knowledge spillovers.
I construct two different measures of this type of net TFP. The first one is
based on R&D spillovers that occur through international trade. The second
one is the portion of TFP not explained by TFP of a technology leading
country.
Then, with a panel of countries, I test whether the effects of social pro-
tection policies and barriers to technology adoption occur in the data in
manners predicted by the theory. Overall, the effect of social protection poli-
cies should be stronger on net TFP growth, whereas the effects of barriers
to technology adoption should be stronger on overall TFP growth. These
patterns are generally supported by the data.
In what follows, I first explain the estimation strategy applied. Then,
I describe the data used. Finally, I present the results from the empirical
analysis.
3.3.1 Estimation Strategy
The theory presented generates five main predictions: (i) that larger social
protection structures will decrease the rate of TFP growth, (ii) that larger
barriers to technology adoption will decrease the rate of TFP growth, (iii)
that larger social protection structures will decrease the rate of TFP growth
net of the contribution of technology adoption, (iv) that the effect of larger
social protection structures is greater on TFP growth than TFP growth net
of the contribution of technology adoption, and (v) that larger barriers to
technology adoption will increase the rate of TFP growth net of the contri-
bution of technology adoption.
In addition, the theory above is also good guide to an empirical explo-
ration of this topic. First, it makes explicit that the presence of knowledge
spillovers requires an analysis that takes into account not only TFP, but also
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its component that does not depend on knowledge spillovers. Second, it pro-
vides a good starting point for an empirical analysis. Third, it serves as a
good guide to interpret empirical results.






Then, for a panel of countries, a natural application of the equation above
to a regression model is
∆ ln(TFPi,t) = β1 ln(Soc.Protectioni,t) + β2 ln(Barriersi,t)
+ β3 ln(TFPleading,t) + β4 ln(TFPi,t)
+ β5 ln(Hum.Capitali,t) + ξi + εi,t,
(3.33)
where i denotes countries, t denotes time, leading denotes the leading coun-
try, and ξi is a country fixed effect. In such a model, the theory predicts
both β1 and β2 to be negative.
Similarly, from the definition of N∗(t), a regression model for this variable
is
∆ ln(TFP ∗i,t) = β1 ln(Soc.Protectioni,t) + β2 ln(Barriersi,t)
+ β3 ln(TFPi,t)
+ β4 ln(Hum.Capitali,t) + ξi + εi,t,
(3.34)
where now TFP ∗ denotes a measure of TFP net of the contribution of techno-
logical adoption. From Propositions 3.1 to 3.4, one expects β1 to be negative,
but β2 to be positive. Moreover, in absolute terms, β1 in the latter model is
expected to be greater than β1 in the former model.
Therefore, to properly estimate the trade-off between TFP growth and
social protection, one must account for the effect of knowledge spillovers.
One first possibility is to estimate equation (3.33) using, instead of countryi’s
TFP, the gap between country i’s technology level and the technology level
of the world leader. This approach, however, is not sufficient, since part of
this gap is determined by the world’s (or leader’s) level of TFP, and, thus,
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different levels of social protection would still have their effects on growth
reduced.
I, therefore, estimate regressions of the type of equations (3.33) and (3.34).
For the first models, I use a standard measure of TFP and obtain its growth
rate. However, for the second type of models, it is necessary to obtain the
component of TFP that does not depend on knowledge spillovers, that is, net
of technology adoption. These net TFP levels and growth rates are computed
in two different ways.
The first approach is based on Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe et al.
(2009). These two studies estimate the size of international R&D spillovers
that occur through international trade. Start by denoting the TFP level of
country i at time t by Fi,t. This TFP level is denoted by
Fi,t = lnYi,t − βi,t lnKi,t − (1− βi,t) lnLi,t, (3.35)
where, for country i at year t, Yi,t is GDP, Ki,t is the capital stock, Li,t is the
labor input as defined by employment in the business sector, and β is the
share of capital on aggregate income.
Then, define R&D expenditure in country i at time t by R&Di,t. Using a
perpetual inventory procedure, compute R&D capital stocks by
Sdi,t = (1− δ)Sdi,t−1 +R&Di,t, (3.36)
where the depreciation rate δ is assumed to be 0.05. Once these stocks are
computed for all countries, for each i, let Sfi,t denotes the sum of the R&D

























wheremi,t stands for the fraction of imports in country i’s GDP. The spillovers
from R&D are then given by δfi,ts. Given these estimates, I compute TFP
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net of spillovers by











There are, however, two caveats with this approach. The first one is that
the data are limited to OECD countries. The second, and more important
one, is that this approach assumes that R&D spillovers occur only through
international trade. Therefore, I compute a second measure of TFP net of
spillovers.
First, I compute TFP for each country by
TFPi,t = lnYi,t − (1/3) lnKi,t − (1− (1/3)) ln(Empi,tHCi,t), (3.39)
where Empi,t is employment, and HCi,t is a index of human capital based
on average years of schooling. Then, I normalize these TFPs relative to the
TFP of the USA in 1990. Finally, TFP ∗i,t is computed as the residual of the
regression of lnTFPi,t on lnTFPUS,t.
I use then these two measures of TFP growth, containing and not con-
taining the contribution of technology adoption and knowledge spillovers, to
estimate the effects of different policies, either in terms of social protection
or in terms of barriers to technology adoption.
Before describing the data used, it is important to note that the estimation
strategy here is not designed to estimate causal effects. Therefore, the results
from this analysis should be interpreted as partial correlations. Nevertheless,
these correlations go a long way in providing evidence either to support or
reject the theoretical results described above.
3.3.2 Data
There are many main sources of data in the present analysis. The first main
source is the 9.0 version of the Penn World Tables (PWT), from Feenstra
et al. (2015). The PWT dataset contains data on macroeconomic aggregates
for a large sample of 195 countries for years 1950 – 2015. From the Penn
World Tables, I use GDP, capital stock, employment, and an index of human
70
capital based on average years of schooling.
The first variables are standard measures and don’t require further expla-
nation. However, it is worthwhile to better explain the human capital index.
This variable is based on the average years of schooling from two different
sources, Barro and Lee (2013) and Cohen and Leker (2014), and on estimated
returns to education from a Mincer-style regression. These returns are esti-
mated on different levels of education attainment (e.g., middle school, high
school, college) , so that this human capital index is the return to education
multiplied by average years of schooling in each country, while allowing for
different levels of education to have different returns.
The second source of data is the dataset from Coe et al. (2009). From
this dataset, I obtain the data on R&D capital stocks used to compute the
first measure of TFP net of knowledge spillovers. The sample contains data
on 24 OECD economies from 1971 to 2004. When connecting these observa-
tions with data on social protection, the sample comprises 24 countries over
three periods of time, 1995, 2000, 2005. In order to increase the number of
observations, I use the value of social protection in 2005 for year 2004.
The next source of data is the Social Protection Expenditure and Per-
formance Reviews supplied by the International Labor Organization. From
there, I obtain data on social protection. In particular, I use the the per-
centage of GDP spent on social protection activities. As a broad definition,
social protection expenditure is defined as interventions from public and pri-
vate bodies to help households and individuals relieve the burden of risks
and needs. These risks are defined from a list that includes sickness, health,
disability, old-age, survivors, family/children, unemployment, housing, and
social exclusion. Defining social protection expenditure as protections against
these risks translates well the idea in the model that social protection as a
reward structure is geared towards providing consumption insurance.
Concretely, these expenditures encompass a wide series of outlays that fall
in the social safety net category like benefits for children and family, unem-
ployment injuries disability, and old age pension benefits. They encompass
173 countries for years 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013.
Figure 3.3 summarizes the data on social protection. There are 1011 obser-
vations, concentrated on low levels of social protection spending relative to
GDP. The average percentage is 10.60% and the median percentage is 8.20%.
These percentages, as shown in Figure 3.4, are also stable over time. This is
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Figure 3.3: Social Protection Expenditures
Figure 3.4: Social Protection Expenditures Between 1995 and 2015
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Figure 3.5: Social Protection and GDP per capita (Excluding Oil-rich
Countries)
reassuring, since these data will be used in a panel context, notwithstanding
the short time duration of the panel.
As Figure 3.5 shows, social protection appears to be positively associated
with GDP per capita. However, as Figure 3.6 shows, the association be-
tween social protection and TFP is positive, although less strong than the
one with GDP. As the discussion above emphasized, given the presence of
knowledge spillovers, this positive association should not be surprising: if
barriers to technology adoption are sufficiently small, knowledge spillovers
make it possible for countries with large social safety nets to enjoy high
economic performance, either in terms of GDP per capita or TFP.
Finally, there are two measures of barriers to technology adoption. Since
these barriers cannot be directly observed, I use proxies in their place. A
natural proxy for these barriers is a measure of how slowly technology diffuses
in a country. However, technology is not a single, homogeneous concept,
being comprised of a wide variety of different goods, services, and methods of
production. Therefore, one must choose which technologies to follow. Given
the period in the sample, and the availability of data, I use the diffusion of
the Internet in each country. The use of Internet diffusion, though, is not
only justified by the years in the sample. More generally, the Internet is
not only a technology, but a way of access to technology and knowledge. A
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Figure 3.6: Social Protection and TFP
slow diffusion of the Internet, then, means a slow diffusion of all technologies
overall.
The World Bank’s World Development Indicators, World Bank (2017),
contain country-level data on the share of the country’s population with
access to the internet for years 1990–2020. Then, it is possible to use the
share without access to the internet as a measure of barriers to technology
adoption. However, as expected, Figure 3.7 shows that there is a strong
negative trend in this variable. Therefore, I ultimately use the change in this
share as a measure of barriers to technology adoption.
The second measure of barriers to technology adoption comes from Djankov
et al. (2002). This study provides data on the regulation of entry of start-up
firms in 85 countries. These data are divided into number of procedures ,
the monetary cost, and the time it takes for a new business to start to op-
erate legally. In particular, I use the number of procedures: a country with
ten procedures or more necessary to open a business is coded as a “high-
barrier” country, whereas a business with fewer than ten procedures is coded
as a “low-barrier” country. Out of the 85 countries, 45 end up coded as low
barrier-countries and 40 as high barrier-countries.
There are three main caveats with this variable. The first and most im-
portant one is the fact that it captures much more than just barriers to
technology adoption. The number of procedures necessary to legally open a
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Figure 3.7: Share of Population Without Internet Access (1995–2015)
business, in fact, may be a better approximation of regulation and bureau-
cracy than barriers to technology adoption. However, since these must be
correlated, its use is justified. This first problem is amplified by the fact
that this measure is time-invariant, preventing the use of country fixed ef-
fects. Therefore, it is impossible to distinguish the effect of these barriers
from other time-invariant country characteristics that affect TFP growth.
Finally, using this variable restricts the sample size by excluding countries
with missing observations. For all of these reasons, the analysis of the effect
of these barriers is left only as a robustness check.
3.3.3 Results
I start by considering the effects of social protection on TFP growth in isola-
tion, leaving the effects of barriers to technology adoption for later. Table 3.1
presents results relative to overall TFP and social protection. As expected,
higher levels of social protection have a negative impact on TFP growth,
although these effects are not significant in all specifications. In fact, it ap-
pears that the inclusion of fixed effects remove the significance of the social
protection coefficients. Thus, when I control for time-invariant country char-
acteristics, higher levels of social protection have no effect on TFP growth.
One explanation for this is that barriers to technology adoption are included
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Table 3.1: TFP and Social Protection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ ln(TFP )
ln(Soc.Protec.) -0.002 -0.007 -0.008* -0.013 -0.011** -0.010 -0.011** -0.011
(0.003) (0.018) (0.004) (0.017) (0.005) (0.020) (0.005) (0.019)
ln(TFP ) 0.021*** 0.074*** 0.017** 0.077*** 0.017** 0.074***
(0.007) (0.019) (0.007) (0.020) (0.007) (0.020)
ln(HumanCap.) 0.009 -0.015 0.007 -0.068**
(0.007) (0.025) (0.007) (0.028)
ln(TFPUS) 0.135** 0.244***
(0.060) (0.083)
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756
Countries 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137
Within R2 0.004 0.004 0.045 0.046 0.038 0.046 0.030 0.057
Between R2 0.001 0.001 0.080 0.080 0.106 0.078 0.121 0.023
Overall R2 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.015 0.014 0.023 0.030 0.006
In parentheses: robust standard errors (clustered on countries). Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Estimation method: OLS.
in these fixed effects, so without accounting properly for these barriers esti-
mates are not significant.
In these results, the inclusion of TFP as a regressor is generally significant,
but not the inclusion of US TFP or human capital. Human capital is only
significant when all other variables are included. Finally, the inclusion of US
TFP is highly significant, indicating that technological spillovers are indeed
an important part of TFP growth.
Overall, however, given the arguments above and Figure 3.6, this lack
of negative relationship between TFP growth and social protection is not
surprising. Recall that greater levels of social protection have no effect on the
knowledge spillovers that increase TFP. Therefore, it is possible for countries
to have high rates of TFP growth while maintaining large social nets.
Table 3.2 presents results regarding the first measure of TFP net of spillovers,
the one based on Coe et al. (2009). Patterns here are similar to those of Table
3.1: once again, there seems to be no relationship between social protection
and TFP growth, at least when fixed effects are included.
Of course, the estimates based on Coe et al. (2009) need to be interpreted
with caution. The first caveat is that the sample size is small, inflating stan-
dard errors. In addition, recall that these estimates of knowledge spillovers
are based on international trade, and it may simply be the case that this is
not appropriate. If the spillovers occur through more channels than just in-
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Table 3.2: Net TFP (Coe & Helpman Estimates) and Social Protection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ ln(netTFP ) (Coe & Helpman)
ln(Soc.Protec.) -0.016* 0.001 -0.014* -0.003 -0.014* -0.007 -0.014* -0.003
(0.009) (0.018) (0.007) (0.023) (0.007) (0.021) (0.007) (0.022)
ln(netTFP ) 0.045*** 0.024 0.044*** 0.002 0.044*** -0.001
(0.012) (0.059) (0.013) (0.089) (0.013) (0.092)
ln(HumanCap.) 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.002
(0.005) (0.069) (0.005) (0.070)
ln(TFPUS) 0.004 0.041
(0.045) (0.074)
Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
Countries 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Within R2 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.016 0.011 0.021 0.023 0.029
Between R2 0.076 0.077 0.080 0.029 0.098 0.031 0.096 0.011
Overall R2 0.037 0.037 0.042 0.006 0.055 0.21 0.056 0.017
In parentheses: robust standard errors (clustered on countries). Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Estimation method: OLS.
ternational trade, the methodology of Coe et al. (2009) will understate them,
and the measures of TFP net of them will be closer of actual TFP, which is
expected (and already known) to not be affected by social protection levels.
Finally, Table 3.3 presents results for the broader measure of net TFP.
Notice that in this case, as in Table 3.2 the inclusion of US TFP and human
capital is not warranted. Then, the preferred specification is the one in
column (4) of Table 3.3. In this specification, higher levels of social protection
have a significant and sizable negative effect on TFP growth, as expected.
Notice also that the inclusion of fixed effects increases the magnitude of this
negative effect.
Moreover, when comparing the estimates in Table 3.3 to the ones in Table
3.1, it is clear that the detrimental effect of social protection on TFP growth
is stronger on TFP growth net of the contribution of technology adoption.
For the preferred specification of column (4), the estimate in the latter ta-
ble is three times as large as the one in the former table. Of course, this
is as predicted by Proposition 3.3, and the intuition is clear. Since social
protection decreases entrepreneurial effort overall, once the effect of knowl-
edge spillovers on TFP growth are removed, this detrimental effect should
be larger. Concretely, this can be interpreted as countries with higher levels
of social protection creating a smaller amount of original ideas. Therefore, if
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Table 3.3: Net TFP and Social Protection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ ln(netTFP )
ln(Soc.Protec.) -0.116*** -0.434** -0.117*** -0.406** -0.127** -0.306 -0.126** -0.306
(0.040) (0.194) (0.042) (0.190) (0.053) (0.250) (0.053) (0.251)
ln(netTFP ) 0.036 0.192** 0.033 0.197** 0.034 0.197**
(0.045) (0.095) (0.045) (0.093) (0.045) (0.094)
ln(HumanCap.) 0.024 -0.209 0.039 -0.208
(0.049) (0.237) (0.051) (0.246)
ln(TFPUS) -0.539 -0.007
(0.540) (0.458)
Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 371 371 371 371 371 371 371 371
Countries 73 73 73 137 73 73 73 73
Within R2 0.012 0.012 0.016 0.027 0.013 0.051 0.015 0.051
Between R2 0.056 0.0056 0.050 0.008 0.053 0.001 0.047 0.001
Overall R2 0.026 0.026 0.029 0.015 0.026 0.002 0.029 0.002
In parentheses: robust standard errors (clustered on countries). Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Estimation method: OLS.
these countries are to grow fast, they must rely on technology adoption and
knowledge spillovers.
Before adding barriers to technology adoption, one note on the lack of
significance of US TFP and human capital in Table 3.3 is worthwhile. In this
case, the net TFP measure is based on a measure of TFP that takes into
account the human capital level. In addition, the spillovers are defined as
the portion of this TFP that is not explained by US TFP. Therefore, neither
variable is expected to enter this regression significantly.
Turning to barriers to technology adoption, Table 3.4 presents estimates re-
garding overall TFP. The first feature of notice is that, as predicted by Propo-
sition 3.2, greater barriers to technology adoption decrease TFP growth. The
statistical significance of these effects depend on the specification used, and
more precisely on the inclusion of country fixed effects, in a patter very sim-
ilar to the one in Table 3.1.
In regards to the effects of social protection policies, Table 3.4 shows that
while these policies still have a detrimental effect on growth, their magnitude
is smaller. In fact, now these effects are less significant than in Table 3.1.
One possible interpretation for this result is that the detrimental effects of
barriers to technology adoption on TFP growth are larger than the effects
of social protection policies. However, since the estimates in Table 3.1 do
not control for the former, they are in fact capturing the effects of barriers
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Table 3.4: TFP, Social Protection, and Barriers to Technology Adoption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ ln(TFP )
ln(Soc.Protec.) -0.005 0.000 -0.009** -0.006 -0.011* 0.003 -0.011* 0.003
(0.004) (0.021) (0.004) (0.020) (0.006) (0.023) (0.006) (0.023)
Barriers -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.002** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(TFP ) 0.019*** 0.068*** 0.018** 0.074*** 0.018** 0.073***
(0.007) (0.023) (0.008) (0.023) (0.008) (0.023)
ln(HumanCap.) 0.004 -0.042* 0.003 -0.073**
(0.007) (0.024) (0.007) (0.031)
ln(TFPUS) 0.067 0.165*
(0.063) (0.099)
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 699 699 699 699 699 699 699 699
Countries 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136
Within R2 0.007 0.007 0.022 0.038 0.019 0.046 0.019 0.051
Between R2 0.082 0.064 0.082 0.037 0.092 0.010 0.098 0.001
Overall R2 0.020 0.012 0.023 0.006 0.025 0.001 0.027 0.001
In parentheses: robust standard errors (clustered on countries). Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation
method: OLS.
rather than the effects of social protection. This explanation seem plausible
in light of the theoretical results. From Proposition 3.3 social protection
policies should have a larger effect on net TFP, and from Propositions 3.2
and 3.4 greater barriers to technology adoption should decrease only overall
TFP growth.
In addition, the estimates Table 3.4 continue to indicate the relevance of
TFP and of TFP in the leading country on TFP growth. Although the effects
of the leading country’s TFP are not as significant as before.
Table 3.5 shows results relative to TFP net of technology adoption as es-
timated using Coe et al. (2009) spillovers. Barriers to technology adoption
have no significant effects in these regressions, whereas social protection poli-
cies tend to decrease the growth rate of net TFP. These estimates, as before,
appear to only be significant when fixed effects are not included. The same
pattern appears for the inclusion of TFP, and the inclusion of human capital
and TFP in the US are not significant.
The results in Table 3.5 are marred by the caveats of using Coe et al. (2009)
spillovers. Nevertheless, they tend to go in the general direction dictated by
the theory. Once spillovers are removed, the effects of social protection poli-
cies are more relevant, the effects of barriers to technology adoption decrease,
and TFP in the leading country becomes irrelevant, since spillovers are ac-
79
Table 3.5: Net TFP (Coe & Helpman Estimates), Social Protection, and Barriers to Technology
Adoption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ ln(netTFP ) (Coe & Helpman)
ln(Soc.Protec.) -0.015* 0.001 -0.013** -0.002 -0.013** -0.007 -0.013** -0.004
(0.008) (0.019) (0.007) (0.024) (0.007) (0.020) (0.007) (0.023)
Barriers -0.001* -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(TFP ) 0.042*** 0.019 0.042*** -0.005 0.043*** -0.006
(0.013) (0.064) (0.013) (0.096) (0.013) (0.098)
ln(HumanCap.) -0.001 0.034 -0.001 0.018
(0.005) (0.076) (0.005) (0.080)
ln(TFPUS) -0.012 0.025
(0.054) (0.071)
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71
Countries 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Within R2 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.018 0.011 0.024 0.012 0.025
Between R2 0.327 0.131 0.349 0.039 0.340 0.060 0.343 0.094
Overall R2 0.154 0.024 0.165 0.008 0.171 0.047 0.172 0.071
In parentheses: robust standard errors (clustered on countries). Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Estimation method: OLS.
counted for.
Finally, Table 3.6 presents results relative to the second estimate of net
TFP growth. Social protection policies here have the expected negative ef-
fects and these effects remain significant even when country fixed effects are
included. Moreover, these effects are greater than the ones seen in Table 3.4.
These results are in line with Propositions 3.1 and 3.3, respectively.
Regarding barriers to technology adoption, the estimated effects on TFP
growth net of technology adoption are all statistically insignificant at the
usual levels. However, it is interesting to notice these estimates are not neg-
ative anymore, they are positive. This is in accordance with what 3.4 pre-
dicts. Since barriers to technology adoption shift human capital towards the
creation of new ideas, growth in TFP that is not attributable to technology
adoption increases.
To sum up, overall, social protection policies decrease TFP growth, both
overall and excluding the effects of knowledge spillovers. Moreover, these
effects are larger in magnitude for the net measure of TFP. Regarding bar-
riers to technology adoption, greater barriers have a detrimental effect on
TFP growth, but not on TFP growth net of spillovers. All of these results,
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Table 3.6: Net TFP, Social Protection, and Barriers to Technology Adoption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ ln(netTFP )
ln(Soc.Protec.) -0.129** -0.536** -0.129** -0.520** -0.144** -0.413 -0.145** -0.412
(0.050) (0.219) (0.053) (0.211) (0.066) (0.274) (0.066) (0.274)
Barriers 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 -0.000 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
ln(TFP ) 0.048 0.188* 0.045 0.193* 0.048 0.202*
(0.051) (0.103) (0.052) (0.101) (0.051) (0.103)
ln(HumanCap.) 0.035 -0.222 0.062 -0.116
(0.055) (0.255) (0.059) (0.272)
ln(TFPUS) -0.989 -0.547
(0.634) (0.504)
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354
Countries 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Within R2 0.077 0.079 0.083 0.092 0.071 0.096 0.056 0.097
Between R2 0.032 0.034 0.028 0.017 0.042 0.008 0.030 0.008
Overall R2 0.036 0.036 0.035 0.032 0.040 0.025 0.046 0.027
In parentheses: robust standard errors (clustered on countries). Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Estimation method: OLS.
importantly, are in accordance with the theory developed above.
3.3.4 Robustness Checks
Given that barriers to technology adoption are not directly observable, a
good check of the robustness of the results above is to use different measures
of these barriers. In this subsection, I use the variables generated from the
Djankov et al. (2002) to check how sensitive the empirical results are to the
variable used to measure barriers to technology adoption.
Recalling that these measures are time-invariant and given by the number
of procedures necessary to legally start operating a new business in a sample
of 85 countries, the results here are from the following regression model:
∆ ln(TFPi,t) = β1 ln(Soc.Protectioni,t) + β2HighBarriersi
+ β3LowBarriersi + β4 ln(TFPi,t)
+ β5 ln(Hum.Capitali,t) + εi,t,
(3.40)
where HighBarriers and LowBarriers are indicator variables. Therefore,
barriers to technology adoption in this model shift the relationship between
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TFP growth and social protection policies up or down.
Tables B.1 to B.3 (in Appendix B) present the results for this analysis.
In Table B.1 the dependent variable is overall TFP. Higher levels of social
protection have a negative effect on TFP growth, and this effect is statistically
significant when control variables are added. Overall, however, barriers to
technology adoption don’t have a significant effect on TFP growth. Moreover,
they appear to have an effect opposite of the expected: lower barriers are
associated with smaller growth.
In Table B.2, the net measure of TFP growth net of spillovers as estimated
by Coe et al. (2009) is the dependent variable. Results in this table appear to
be too noisy to have a proper interpretation: social protection has a positive,
while insignificant, effect on growth, and barriers to technology adoption,
while significant, don’t have a differential impact on TFP growth at any
usual significance level.
Finally, in Table B.3, net TFP is the dependent variable. Like before,
barriers to technology adoption are significant, but have no differential effect.
However, higher levels of social protection do indeed decrease net TFP growth
and their effects are greater than on overall TFP growth, as expected.
it should be no surprise that the results regarding technology adoption are
more noisy in this case. After all, the sample is smaller, and the measure
itself is not as good as the change in the share of the population without
internet. However, it is reassuring to notice that the patterns relative to
social protection policies remain unaffected.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter explored the relationship between TFP growth, social protec-
tion, and barriers to technology adoption. Through a model of endogenous
technological change with knowledge spillovers, a moral hazard problem that
entrepreneurs face, and barriers to technology adoption, it establishes that
higher levels of social protection should decrease innovation efforts.
In addition, it establishes differential impacts of social protection policies
and barriers to technology adoption on two different types of TFP growth:
overall TFP growth and TFP growth net of the contribution of technology
adoption and knowledge spillovers. While social protection policies decrease
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both growth rates and have a greater effect on net TFP growth, barriers to
technology adoption decrease overall TFP growth but increase TFP growth
attributable to the creation of new ideas.
Using a panel of countries, the predictions above are supported by data.
Overall, social protection policies do decrease TFP growth, and their effect is
more pronounced on TFP growth net of knowledge spillovers. In addition, the
effects of greater barriers to technology adoption are negative on overallTFP
growth but positive, while statistically insignificant, on net TFP growth.
Regardless of significance considerations, however, the pattern is clear and
in accordance with the theory developed here: while social protection has a
stronger effect on TFP growth net of spillovers, barriers to technology adop-
tion have a larger effect on overall TFP growth. This is intuitive: while
social protection affects negatively the efforts of all entrepreneurs in an econ-
omy, barriers to technology adoption shift entrepreneurial effort towards the
creation of original ideas.
Some avenues for future research appear from this analysis. The first one
is to establish these empirical effects from a causal perspective instead of just
partial correlations. Moreover, improving the measures of barriers to tech-
nology adoption might be a good direction for future research, since it may
provide better and less noisy estimates of the effects of these policies. In ad-
dition, the interconnections between the two types of policies are also a topic
worth exploring. Finally, connecting the analysis here to other important
topics in endogenous growth theory may be a worthwhile endeavor. A com-
mon question in this area is the importance of scale effects on the creation
of knowledge and whether new ideas are getting harder to find. How would
these two issues affect the topics here analyzed is an interesting question.
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ADDITIONAL TABLES FOR CHAPTER 2
Table A.1: Early Literacy and Political Institutions, and Positive Cultural Traits, First
Stage Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PC Culture Positive Cond. PC Culture Positive.
Schooling 1960 -0.10 -0.34 -0.16 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.30) (0.24) (0.23) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
(0.21) (0.09)*** (0.22) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Urbanization 1850 -0.03 -0.08 -0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.14) (0.17) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(0.13) (0.12) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Literacy 0.61 0.42 0.01 0.01
(0.14)*** (0.10)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
(0.27)* (0.14)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
PC Institutions 11.71 10.48 0.03 0.01
(2.56)*** (2.64)*** (0.04) (0.03)
(3.26)*** (1.63)*** (0.06) (0.04)
N 65 69 67 65 67 65
Adj. R2 0.70 0.74 0.79 0.74 0.67 0.73
In parentheses: robust standard errors (above), clustered on countries (below). Significance: * p <
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation method: OLS in columns (1)-(3), weighted OLS in columns
(4)-(6) with inverse of standard errors of conditional culture (principal component) as weights. Country
fixed effects always included.
88
Table A.2: Robustness of Patent Estimates, Including PC Institutions as a Regressor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patent Applications
Schooling 1960 -4.03 1.41 -3.97 -0.40 0.39 2.48
(4.22) (4.02) (2.85) (3.50) (2.50) (3.53)
(4.84) (5.00) (2.85) (3.80) (2.92) (4.61)
Urbanization 1850 -3.49 -3.51 -3.52 -2.41 -2.05 -3.23
(1.53)** (1.59)** (1.65)** (1.57) (1.50) (1.44)**
(1.24)** (1.75)* (1.91) (1.82) (1.92) (1.74)
PC Institutions 16.36 64.46 -19.11 37.20 -38.91 62.24
(53.40) (66.31) (45.02) (64.23) (49.86) (60.05)




PC Culture 8.34 827.72
(2.79)*** (338.16)**
(3.56)* (445.14)
PC Culture Pos. 9.76 703.59
(2.87)*** (277.77)**
(3.61)** (311.42)*
Conditional? No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 60 60 60 60 60 60
Adj. R2 0.63 0.68 0.64 0.67 0.68 0.72
In parentheses: robust standard errors (above), clustered on countries (below). Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation method: 2SLS, weighted by the inverse of the conditional cultural variable
in columns (4) and (6). Country fixed effects always included. Instruments: literacy.
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Table A.3: Early Literacy and Political Institutions, First Stage Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-Scientists and Engineers
Schooling 1960 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)*** (0.03)*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)** (0.01)*** (0.03)
Urbanization 1850 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)* (0.01)*** (0.01)
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)** (0.02)
PC Institutions 0.20 0.11 0.46 0.34 0.61 0.13
(0.32) (0.37) (0.35) (0.47) (0.40) (0.32)




PC Culture -0.06 -7.11
(0.04) (4.76)
(0.06) (6,67)
PC Culture Pos. -0.08 -6.03
(0.04)* (3.95)
(0.06) (4.91)
Conditional? No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 59 59 59 59 59 59
Adj. R2 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.94
In parentheses: robust standard errors (above), clustered on countries (below). Significance:
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation method: 2SLS, weighted by the inverse of the
conditional cultural variable in columns (4) and (6). Country fixed effects always included.
Instruments: literacy.
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Table A.4: Robustness of Number of Firms Estimates, Including PC Institutions as a Regressor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Firms
Schooling 1960 -13776.29* -7540.59* -11404.72* -9055.00* -7650.26* -7039.56
(7853.67)* (4415.30)* (6209.26)* (5260.06)* (4553.06)* (4606.14)
(7699.85) (7119.89) (4347.44)* (5691.32) (3161.73)* (6231.01)
Urbanization 1850 3751.23 3893.80 5436.73 4375.84 6395.06 3993.71
(2535.43) (1452.79)*** (2160.66)** (1283.79)*** (1978.83)*** (1494.43)***
(771.85)*** (1290.29)** (1372.09)** (1492.92)** (1695.10)** (1313.82)**
PC Institutions -78319.00 30046.57 -51026.63 6323.19 -76852.68 65164.80
(127326.33) (124308.34) (81318.56) (140710.34) (96623.48) (118739.97)




PC Culture 7716.07 800565.68
(5822.37) (733523.58)
(5966.27) (876832.15)
PC Culture Pos. 9645.78 565704.40
(7045.22) (537327.93)
(7081.71) (589975.83)
Conditional? No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 39 39 41 39 41 39
Adj. R2 0.19 0.64 0.54 0.63 0.62 0.64
In parentheses: robust standard errors (above), clustered on countries (below). Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. Estimation method: 2SLS, weighted by the inverse of the conditional cultural variable in columns (4) and (6). Country
fixed effects always included. Instruments: literacy.
Table A.5: Robustness of Persons Employed Estimates, Including PC Institutions as a Regressor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Scientists and Engineers
Schooling 1960 -93232.75 -35197.36 -77634.46 -50975.15 -44898.49 -31063.32
(56141.34)* (37669.17) (34513.73)** (35530.41) (23519.04)* (27743.89)
(32558.49)** (35221.83) (17061.57)** (27354.33) (9311.02)*** (33503.19)
Urbanization 1850 16790.68 21362.32 29311.91 26282.01 37667.77 22492.02
(18759.58) (11029.75)* (13035.48)** (9804.90)*** (10926.34)*** (9937.63)**
(2363.41)*** (10096.48) (8841.92)** (12296.43)* (10472.55)** (11003.21)
PC Institutions -732113.42 -187471.72 -504139.82 -419048.31 -729322.99 162700.07
(825732.11) (750267.78) (465051.62) (914114.51) (559887.44) (707367.76)




PC Culture 67278.17 7924155.19
(38115.15)* (5301177.45)
(44600.47) (7193307.18)
PC Culture Pos. 84103.69 5602884.84
(44251.52)* (3756999.09)
(47225.45) (4460257.93)
Conditional? No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 39.00 39.00 41.00 39.00 41.00 39.00
Adj. R2 -1.02 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.36 0.32
In parentheses: robust standard errors (above), clustered on countries (below). Significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Estimation method: 2SLS, weighted by the inverse of the conditional cultural variable in columns (4) and (6). Country fixed effects
always included. Instruments: literacy.
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Reg.Bruxelles-Cap./Br Belgium BE1 16.56 -0.7342 -0.6145
Vlaams Gewest Belgium BE2 20.91 -0.6303 -0.3863
Region Wallonne Belgium BE3 3.74 -0.7980 -0.6677
Ile De FRance France FR1 12.34 -0.6047 -0.5194
Paris Basin East/West France FR2 4.26 -0.7197 -0.6398
North FR France FR3 4.24 -0.8135 -0.6747
East FR France FR4 3.72 -0.6532 -0.4516
West FR France FR5 8.58 -0.4821 -0.4118
South West FR France FR6 6.09 -0.6271 -0.5499
South East FR France FR7 10.18 -0.5617 -0.4692
Mediterrean FR France FR8 1.50 -0.7982 -0.6964
Baden-Wuerttemberg Germany DE1 18.00 -0.2466 -0.2496
Bayern Germany DE2 22.95 -0.4294 -0.4118
Bremen Hamburg Germany DE5 DE6 12.12 -0.6612 -0.4955
Hessen Germany DE7 24.89 -0.0746 -0.1458
Niedersachsen Germany DE9 20.76 -0.1404 -0.2350
Nordrhein-Westfalen Germany DEA 30.49 -0.2641 -0.2890
Rheinland-Pfalz Saarl Germany DEB DEC 36.02 -0.4919 -0.4102
Schleswig-Holstein Germany DEF 12.90 -0.5146 -0.5482
Piemonte - Vallle D’Aosta Italy ITC1 ITC2 22.71 -0.7414 -0.6010
Liguria Italy ITC3 30.92 -0.5155 -0.4495
Lombardia Italy ITC4 23.18 -0.7456 -0.7011






Emilia-Romagna Italy ITD5 23.29 -0.5502 -0.4247
Toscana Italy ITE1 18.63 -0.7221 -0.7620
Umbria - Marche Italy ITE2 ITE3 5.68 -0.8122 -0.6194
Lazio Italy ITE4 21.87 -0.7908 -0.7164
Campania Italy ITF3 4.31 -1.1487 -1.0722






Puglia Italy ITF4 3.1292 -1.1654 -1.0142
Calabria Italy ITF6 7.4496 -1.0503 -0.8175
Sicilia - Sardegna Italy ITG1 ITG2 2.6180 -1.3056 -1.2805
Noord Nederland - Groningen Netherlands NL1 40.05 -0.2807 -0.0618
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Oost Nederland Netherlands NL2 38.75 -0.2864 -0.1085
West Nederland Netherlands NL3 42.08 -0.1788 -0.0476
Zuid Nederland Netherlands NL4 40.70 -0.2530 -0.1061
Galicia Spain ES11 4.8747 -0.6140 -0.3728
Asturias-Cantabria Spain ES12 ES13 42.8146 0.0962 0.1049
Pais Vasco Spain ES21 10.6075 -0.1508 -0.0579
Navarra - Rioja Spain ES22 ES23 32.6523 -0.1842 0.0100
Aragon Spain ES24 24.6047 -0.6439 -0.5792
Madrid Spain ES30 21.9695 -0.3416 -0.0404
Castilla-Leon Spain ES41 21.3850 -0.2744 -0.1457
Castilla-La Mancha Spain ES42 29.1067 -0.6069 -0.4003
Extremadura Spain ES43 -6.5258 -0.5028 -0.2509
Cataluna Spain ES51 15.6759 -0.2763 -0.3634
Comunidad Valenciana Spain ES52 8.6441 -0.5597 -0.4747
Baleares Spain ES53 0.4941 -0.9667 -1.1511
Andalucia Spain ES61 24.6120 -0.4398 -0.2327
Murcia Spain ES62 35.0445 -0.1766 -0.0727
Canarias Spain ES70 6.9644 -0.1412 0.0754
North UK UK UKC UKD1 18.79 -0.6011 -0.2172
Yorkshire And Humbers UK UKE 16.2143 -0.4556 -0.1642
East Midlands UK UKF 23.80 -0.3565 -0.2053
West Midlands UK UKG 13.26 -0.4061 -0.2613
East Anglia UK UKH1 24.36 -0.3451 -0.1705




South West UK UK UKK 18.65 -0.4008 -0.1869




Wales UK UKL 6.95 -1.0548 -0.6419
Scotland UK UKM 25.83 -0.3978 -0.0656
Northern Ireland UK UKN 14.5057 -0.5278 -0.1510
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APPENDIX B
ADDITIONAL TABLES FOR CHAPTER 3
Table B.1: TFP, Social Protection, and Alternative Barriers
to Technology Adoption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln(TFP )
ln(Soc.Protec.) -0.003 -0.005 -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
HighBarriers 0.024** -0.011 -0.017 -0.474
(0.011) (0.062) (0.061) (0.510)
LowBarriers 0.021** -0.017 -0.028 -0.485
(0.010) (0.064) (0.064) (0.510)






N 489 489 489 489
Countries 85 85 85 85
R2 0.059 0.059 0.076 0.076
In parentheses: robust standard errors (clustered on countries). Sig-
nificance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation method:
OLS.
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Table B.2: Net TFP (Coe & Helpman Estimates), Social
Protection, and Alternative Barriers to Technology
Adoption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln(netTFP ) (Coe & Helpman)
ln(Soc.Protec.) 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.013*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
HighBarriers -0.024 -0.177** -0.204** -0.052
(0.021) (0.078) (0.083) (0.247)
LowBarriers -0.019 -0.173** -0.204** -0.053
(0.022) (0.078) (0.086) (0.248)






N 66 66 66 66
Countries 22 22 22 22
R2 0.450 0.467 0.465 0.461
In parentheses: robust standard errors (clustered on countries). Sig-
nificance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation method:
OLS.
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Table B.3: Net TFP, Social Protection, and Alternative
Barriers to Technology Adoption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln(netTFP )
ln(Soc.Protec.) -0.106** -0.107** -0.110** -0.118**
(0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051)
HighBarriers 0.376** 1.791 1.779 11.212**
(0.148) (1.204) (1.222) (5.077)
LowBarriers 0.349** 1.782 1.766 11.167**
(0.152) (1.224) (1.248) (5.088)






N 258 258 258 258
Countries 85 85 85 85
R2 0.105 0.116 0.113 0.146
In parentheses: robust standard errors (clustered on countries). Sig-
nificance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation method:
OLS.
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